Massa, J.
The jurisprudence of the insanity defense in Indiana—spanning nearly two centuries—is deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition, marked by periodic policy changes to the standards for evaluating criminal responsibility. Throughout this evolution, one principle stands the test of time: Whether the defendant meets the standards of insanity is a question for the trier of fact, that “sole sentinel in the protection of both the rights of the accused and the welfare of society.” Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 616–17, 251 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1969). And in rendering its judgment, the factfinder—whether judge or jury—may consider all evidence relevant to the defendant’s mental state. Id.
In this case, all three mental-health experts concluded that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions. … The trial court rejected the insanity defense and relied on evidence of the defendant’s demeanor in rendering its verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Because the factfinder may discredit expert testimony and rely instead on other probative evidence from which to infer the defendant’s sanity, we affirm the trial court’s GBMI conviction.
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By the early 2000s, Barcroft’s marriage had failed, leaving her in a state of depression. She sought counseling and underwent periodic mental health evaluations on an outpatient basis. But other than ADHD, medical records indicate no formal diagnoses of a psychiatric disorder. Still, her cognitive faculties continued to wane. And, in 2007, Barcroft—living then with her son, Jordan Asbury, and his wife Tamia—began to exhibit increasingly odd behavior. …
Concerned with his mother’s deteriorating mental health, and fearful for Tamia’s life, Asbury confided in Jaman Iseminger, a pastor at the family’s church. Pastor Jaman believed Barcroft needed prayers and hospitalization. And he urged Asbury to have his mother leave the home. Indeed, Barcroft moved out sometime in early 2012 to live with her mother.
Two or three months later, on the morning of May 19, 2012, Pastor Jaman was working in his church office. He had arrived early, having arranged to meet Jeff Harris, a church volunteer planning to lead a workshop that day. Just before 7:00 a.m., as Harris was preparing coffee in the church kitchen, he noticed someone walking alongside the building outside, dressed in black clothing and carrying a backpack.
Harris went outside to find this person—later identified as Barcroft— peering into a window of the church basement. When he approached her, Barcroft asked if Pastor Jaman was there. … Suddenly, a single gunshot shattered the early-morning silence. Harris turned to find Barcroft pointing a gun in his direction, commanding him to “Go. Go.”
… Moments later, Pastor Jaman emerged from the church, gasping for help as he staggered and then collapsed to the ground. By the time Harris and Walden reached him, Pastor Jaman had lost consciousness. The twenty-nine-year-old clergyman died soon after, having suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the chest.
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The State charged Barcroft with murder and sought a sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2012) (murder); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11 (2012) (sentencing enhancement). Barcroft invoked the insanity defense and waived her right to a trial by jury.
Three mental-health experts testified at Barcroft’s bench trial: court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. George Parker, court-appointed psychologist Dr. Don Olive, and defense psychologist Dr. Stephanie Callaway. All three experts concluded that Barcroft was legally insane at the time of the offense and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions. No expert found evidence of feigning or malingering.
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The trial court judge found Barcroft GBMI, sentencing her to fifty-five years with five years suspended to mental-health probation. While acknowledging Barcroft’s “complex delusions,” the court ultimately concluded that she understood the gravity of her crime. In reaching this decision, the court relied on evidence of Barcroft’s demeanor: her sophisticated plan to commit the crime, her self-restraint in waiting for Pastor Jaman at the church, her decision to spare the life of an eyewitness to the shooting, her later escape and attempt to hide, her cooperation with police, and her stated intent of avoiding arrest. The court also found that Barcroft had a “separate and conflicting motivation” for the crime, a motivation to avoid scrutiny of—and possible detention for—her mental illness because of Pastor Jaman’s advice to her son.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. Barcroft v. State, 89 N.E.3d 448, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated. The majority, relying on this Court’s decision in Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. 2010), concluded that— absent evidence of malingering and because of Barcroft’s history of mental illness and the unanimous expert opinion—“the demeanor evidence relied on by the trial court simply had no probative value.” The dissent, however, would have affirmed in deference to the factfinder, concluding that Barcroft’s “demeanor, behavior, and statements before, during, and immediately after the crime,” supported “a reasonable inference of sanity.”
We granted the State’s petition to transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). …
A factfinder’s determination that “a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference from” an appellate court. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709. On review, we do not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb the factfinder’s reasonable inferences. Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ind. 2015). We will instead affirm the trial court’s conviction unless “the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004).
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There is no dispute here that Barcroft suffered from mental illness when she shot and killed Pastor Jaman. So, the question is whether, at the time of the shooting, she understood the wrongfulness of her actions.
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When a person invokes the insanity defense, all relevant evidence is admissible, including evidence which a court may otherwise find inadmissible. Garner v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ind. 1998). …
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We thus find the demeanor evidence more than sufficient to support the trial court’s rejection of Barcroft’s insanity defense. Cf. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 715 (finding “very little evidence” of the defendant’s demeanor during the crime to support the trial court’s conviction).
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We agree that mental-health experts play an important role in cases involving the insanity defense. But we refuse to elevate the value of expert opinion over other forms of probative evidence, as Barcroft would have us do. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149; Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710.
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Taken together, the flaws, inconsistencies, and concessions in the experts’ opinion testimony also support the trial court’s rejection of Barcroft’s insanity defense. See Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
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The lack of a well-documented history of mental illness—whether schizophrenia or other acute psychiatric disorder—does not necessarily preclude a finding of insanity. But “the lack of such history is a circumstance that a fact-finder may consider in evaluating an insanity defense.” Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1282.
In sum, we hold that evidence of Barcroft’s demeanor—taken together with the flaws in the expert opinion testimony and the absence of a well-documented history of mental illness—was sufficient to support an inference of sanity. Although some evidence could have led to a contrary finding, we cannot say that the “evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins.
Goff, J., dissenting.
As our legislature has recognized, when mental illness renders a person incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, the law excuses her would be criminal conduct. This notion is foundational to our criminal justice system.
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Indiana’s insanity defense stands apart from other criminal defenses, and rightly so. It would be unjust to punish a person suffering from a mental disease or defect that prevented her from appreciating the wrongfulness of her conduct. And so Indiana law requires that mental health experts aid factfinders in sanity determinations. While judges and juries sit as the final authorities on a defendant’s sanity, our Galloway opinion instructs that their authority cannot, and should not, go unchecked. In my view, the majority loosens Galloway’s limitations on demeanor evidence and thereby erodes Indiana’s insanity defense. I respectfully dissent.
Slaughter, J., joins.