May, J.
Gerald F. Scott appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. [Footnote omitted.] Gerald argues that, when an estate is open, tort claims related to that estate must be brought in probate court. Because the claims at issue herein were not known until after the probate court statute of limitations had passed, appellees have no recourse in probate court. As we hold their claims can be brought in civil court, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Gerald’s motion to dismiss.
….
Here, Daughters noted, at the hearing in August, that because of the nine-month time limitation for bringing a claim under the probate code, see Ind. Code § 29-1-14-1(d) (“[a]ll claims barrable under subsection (a) shall be barred if not filed within nine (9) months after the death of the decedent”), they did not have a remedy in the Estate. Unlike Susanne Minton, who had an active will contest claim in probate court, Daughters’ objections were noted and served to object to the accounting but did not preserve their claims as to the assets transferred from Rebecca to Sons prior to Rebecca’s death. Additionally, Daughters do not argue they are contesting the will—merely Sons’ appropriation of property Daughters had expected to be included in the assets of the Estate. As Daughters are not contesting the will, but rather Sons’ interference with inheritance, Daughters’ claims are barred within the Estate because they were not filed within nine months of the death of Rebecca. Therefore, Daughters do not have a remedy in the Estate. This is just the type of situation wherein Indiana has recognized the claim of tortious interference with inheritance ought to exist. See Minton, 671 N.E.2d at 162.
….
Tort claim statutes of limitation have been extended in situations wherein no reasonable person could have known a claim could or should be made. See, e.g., Umolu v. Rosolik, 666 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations), reh’g denied. However, “one of the basic tenets of public policy governing our Probate Code is the uniform and expeditious distribution of property of a decedent.” Kuzma v. Peoples Tr. & Sav. Bank, Boonville, 132 Ind. App. 176, 183, 176 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1961), reh’g denied. Because of this basic tenet, claims against the decedent or the estate must be brought within the probate administration in order to ensure efficient distribution. Inlow v. Henderson, Daily, Withrow & DeVoe, 787 N.E.2d 385, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Those claims are further controlled by the probate code time limits wherein all claims must be brought to the notice of the personal representative in a timely manner so distribution may occur. See Ind. Code § 29-1-14-1 (claims against an estate must be brought within certain time limits or “shall be forever barred”).
Unlike Markey or Minton, Rebecca did not change her will and disinherit Daughters. In Markey and Minton, as soon as the will was submitted for probate, the expectant heirs could discern the contract, in the form of a will, had been changed and were on notice to object. Here, Daughters knew Rebecca died, they knew the mutual wills had been executed, and they knew that will was the will submitted for probate. The fact the assets were no longer in Rebecca’s Estate to be distributed as the will specified was not apparent until the accounting was filed, which occurred after the probate time limits had lapsed. With the probate code public policy concerns in mind, it is unreasonable to extend the probate court time limits; rather, as both claims are viable Indiana torts, it is reasonable to permit Daughters’ Tort Claims to proceed in the trial court.
Conclusion
As it pertains to inheritance, we have acknowledged that Indiana recognizes a party may make a separate tort claim, provided they cannot acquire adequate relief in the probate court. Minton, 671 N.E.2d at 162. Here, we have just that situation—Daughters cannot obtain adequate relief within the Estate because they were unaware of the loss of assets until after the probate code time limits had lapsed. It is against public policy to extend the probate court time limits. Therefore, Daughters have rightfully filed their claims as a separate tort action and the trial court did not err when it denied Gerald’s motion to dismiss Daughters’ Tort Claims. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.