Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Ramiro Velasquez Avila (Avila), appeals the trial court’s Order appointing him guardian of his minor sister, Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis (Irma), because the trial court refused to articulate special immigrant juvenile findings in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
ISSUE
Avila presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court was required to make findings on Irma’s special immigrant juvenile status in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
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On March 2, 2018, Avila petitioned the trial court to appoint him as guardian of his sister and requested the trial court to make certain findings necessary for Irma to seek classification as a special immigrant juvenile before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). On May 11, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on Avila’s petition. During the hearing, the trial court felt “very uncomfortable making those kinds of findings.” (Transcript p. 17). The court stated that it had “a real problem” because the federal government “[t]hrowing it on me to make factual findings for them [is] irritat[ing].” (Tr. p. 20). “It should be made by [f]ederal officials. They’re the one that makes the decision of who comes in the United States, who leave the United States, not me. And that’s why I have a problem with this . . .. Immigration [j]udges are [i]mmigration [j]udges for a reason. That’s their decision.” (Tr. pp. 21-22)…
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To be eligible to petition the federal government for SIJ status, the resident alien must be under the age of 21 and unmarried. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). The child must have been declared dependent upon a state juvenile court “or whom the court . . . has legally . . . placed under the custody of . . . an individual[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). In addition, the juvenile court must make two additional findings: (1) “reunification with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;” and (2) “it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), (ii). The language of the first finding is designed to “prevent youths from using this remedy for the purpose of obtaining legal permanent resident status, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.” In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Neb. 2012) (quoting 3 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 35.09(1) at 35-36 (rev. ed. 2001), citing H.R. Rep. No. 105- 405(1997) (Conf. Rep.)). Although the juvenile court determines whether the evidence supports the findings, the final decision regarding SIJ status rests with the federal government. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27(J)(iii).
Accordingly, the process for obtaining SIJ status is “‘a unique hybrid procedure that directs the collaboration of state and federal systems.’” In re Marisol N.H., 115 A.D. 3d 185, 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (quoting In re Hei Ting C., 109 A.D. 3d 100, 104 (N.Y. 2013)). In this hybrid proceeding, the state juvenile court is charged with making the factual inquiry relevant to SIJ status when an unmarried, resident alien child is found to be dependent on the court. “The SIJ statute affirms the institutional competence of state courts as the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best interests.” In re J.J.X.C., 318 Ga. App. at 425. Therefore, courts in other states have held that a juvenile court errs by failing to consider a request for SIJ findings. See id.; In re Mohammed B., 83 A.D. 3d 829, 831 (N.Y.A.D. 2011) (child moved for SIJ findings during guardianship proceeding in family court); In re Interest of Luis G., 764 N.W. 2d 648 (Neb. 2009) (motions regarding SIJ status filed during juvenile cases addressing guardianship and foster care). “By making these preliminary factual findings, the juvenile court is not rendering an immigration determination.” H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A.3d 849, 858 (N.J. 2015). The predicate order issued by a state court is merely a prerequisite that must be fulfilled before a juvenile can submit his or her application for SIJ status to USCIS in the form of an I-360 petition. Id. If USCIS approves the juvenile’s I-360, he or she will be granted SIJ status. Id.
Thus, a state court’s role in the SIJ process is not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned in their best interests to their home country…
Thus, although state courts do not make immigration decisions, it is inescapable that a minor seeking SIJ status is dependent upon a state court to make the prerequisite findings in a predicate order for the minor to qualify for such status under the scheme established by federal immigration law. Here, however, the trial court’s Order is silent regarding any decision on the SIJ factors despite Avila’s request. Likewise, the trial court did not state a basis for declining to make SIJ findings nor did it state that it had considered the SIJ findings and rejected them. Although the trial court is authorized to conclude that the petitioner failed to present evidence to support the SIJ factors or that the presented evidence was not credible, the court nevertheless has a duty to consider the SIJ factors and to make findings. In this unusual setting, where a state court is charged with addressing an issue relevant only to federal immigration law, we cannot affirm the trial court’s Order without some positive indication that the court actually addressed Avila’s request. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s appointment of a guardian but remand to the trial court with instruction to consider the request for SIJ findings in light of the evidence presented and articulate the relevant determinations pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred when it failed to make findings on Irma’s special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s appointment of a guardian but remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur