Pyle, J.
Statement of the Case
G.C. (“Putative Father”) filed motion to set aside the adoption of the minor child L.G.K. (“Child”) by J.K., her maternal grandfather (“Maternal Grandfather”). Maternal Grandfather appeals, raising one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s motion for relief from judgment. We conclude that because Maternal Grandfather presented an adoption petition to the trial court in which E.K. (“Mother”) fraudulently claimed that she did not know the identity of Child’s father, the trial court did not err in granting Putative Father’s motion for relief from judgment and setting aside the adoption.
We affirm.
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The issue before us is whether the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s motion for relief from judgment. Maternal Grandfather argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for relief from judgment, and that the trial court should have upheld the adoption decree and dismissed Putative Father’s paternity action. According to Putative Father, the trial court reached the correct result because Mother and Maternal Grandfather perpetrated fraud 0n the court by misrepresenting their knowledge of the existence of Putative Father as Child’s biological father. In his reply brief, Maternal Grandfather maintains that “[Putative] Father cannot cry “‘fraud’”, as Mother is not to blame for [Putative Father’s] own inaction in failing to register” with the Putative Father Registry. (Maternal Grandfather’s Reply Br. 9). [Footnote omitted.]
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Here, Putative Father alleges that Mother “misrepresented to [Putative Father] the facts regarding his relationship with [Child], and [Maternal Grandfather] and Mother misrepresented their knowledge about the existence of [Putative Father] as [Child’s] biological father[, and that] [a]s result 0f these misrepresentations, [Putative Father] failed to file with the putative father registry“ and the trial court granted [Maternal Grandfather’s] adoption petition.” (Putative Father’s Br. 11). This allegation thus alleges an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court’s decision and that such acts prevented Putative Father from fairly presenting his case. See Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 357. We agree.
Putative Father grasped the opportunity to undertake his parental responsibilities toward Child by exercising regular visitation with Child, paying child support to Mother, and attending Child’s doctor’s appointments. At the same time, Mother was holding Putative Father out as Child’s father, accepting child support payments, and permitting Putative Father to exercise visitation. This continued even after Maternal Grandfather filed the adoption petition. Mother allowed Putative Father to keep Child over weekend in June 2017, after the adoption petition was granted and before Putative Father was made aware of the adoption. Mother knew that Child called Putative Father “dad,” and Mother, Putative Father, and Child had all lived together for period of time. In addition, Putative Father was led t0 believe, and indeed believed; he was Child’s father. Nevertheless, Maternal Grandfather fraudulently presented an adoption petition to the trial court claiming that Mother did not know the identity of Child’s father.
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We are aware and acknowledge that INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-18 governs the waiver of notice rights of unregistered putative fathers, providing that, “A putative father who fails to register within the period specified by section 12 of this chapter waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied consent to the child’s adoption.” LC. § 31—19-5-18. INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a) sets forth the time period in which putative father must register, that is, for our purposes, within thirty days of the child’s birth or by the date on which the petition to adopt the child is filed, whichever is later. We also acknowledge that statutes and established caselaw provide that “a putative father whose consent has been implied may not challenge the adoption or establish paternity.” See, e.g., In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d 292, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); In re Adoption and Paternity of K.A.W., 99 N.E.3d 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); I.C. §§ 31-19-9-13, —14.
Here, a verified petition for adoption was filed by Maternal Grandfather that stated that Mother did not disclose the name of Child’s putative father. See I.C. § 3 1-19-5-1. [Footnote omitted.] However, evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that both Maternal Grandfather and Mother knew that Putative Father was Child’s father, and that Mother chose not to disclose this. Regardless of Putative Father’s statutory waiver of notice of the adoption proceeding for failure to register with the Putative Father Registry, the fraud perpetrated by Mother and Maternal Grandfather precluded the trial court from having an opportunity to consider Putative Father’s relationship, as well as his family’s relationship, with Child which compromises the best-interests aspect of the adoption decision-making process. See I.C. § 31-19-1 1-1(a)(1). [Footnote omitted.] Under this set of facts, and in support of the trial court’s belief that Mother lacked credibility at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude that Putative Father was entitled to equitable relief, notwithstanding Putative Father’s failure to register with the Putative Father Registry.
Based on the foregoing, we find that Mother and Maternal Grandfather engaged in an unconscionable plan or scheme to improperly influence the court’s decision regarding the adoption, that such acts ultimately prevented Putative Father from fairly challenging the adoption of Child, and that Putative Father established prima-facie showing of meritorious defense. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s motion for relief from judgment and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.