Bradford, J.
Case Summary
C.Y. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s determination that T.T. and M.M. (collectively, “the Children”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the CHINS petitions filed by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), which motion was made on the ground that the factfinding hearing was not completed within the statutorily-mandated timeframe. Because we agree, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. [Footnote omitted.]
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Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1,… We recently interpreted this statute, concluding “there is no longer any reason to believe that the General Assembly intends [the statute] to mean anything other than what its clear language indicates, i.e., that a factfinding hearing shall be completed within” the statutorily-mandated timeframe and failure to do so “is grounds for dismissal.” Matter of J.R., 98 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphases in original). We further concluded that “if we were to allow the deadline to be ignored here, trial courts could habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no consequence whatsoever.” Id.
The parties agree that the 120-day deadline for concluding the factfinding hearing was December 17, 2017. DCS argues, however, that dismissal was not necessary because (1) it did not believe that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 created “a hard and fast deadline” and (2) Mother waived her objection by agreeing to the continuance. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. Contrary to DCS’s argument, we believe that the General Assembly clearly intends for the timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 to be a certain deadline. Further, while subsection (a) provides that the parties may waive the initial 60-day deadline by agreeing to a continuance, subsection (b) does not include any such provision. This lack of allowance for an additional extension of time indicates that the General Assembly intends to require that a factfinding hearing must be completed within 120 days of the filing of a CHINS petition regardless of any act or agreements of the parties. To allow the parties to agree to dates beyond the maximum 120-day limit would thwart the legislative purpose of timely rehabilitation and reunification of families that are subject to CHINS proceedings. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. [Footnote omitted.]
We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.