May, J.
Jonathan Hummel appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error. Hummel’s appeal arises after the appointment of a special judge to hear Hummel’s post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition. The special judge first approved an agreement between the State and Hummel that modified Hummel’s sentence and called for dismissal of Hummel’s PCR petition. Approximately forty-five minutes later, the special judge revoked his approval of the agreement and reinstated Hummel’s PCR petition. Hummel filed a motion to correct error from the trial court’s reversal of the judgment it had entered in his favor, which the trial court denied, leading to Hummel’s notice of appeal.
… As to the merits of Hummel’s appeal, the State counters the special judge was correct in his determination he did not have the authority to modify the underlying sentence; thus, the special judge did not err when he denied Hummel’s motion to correct error.
We reverse and remand.
On April 23, 2012, Hummel pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Class A felony dealing in a narcotic drug, two counts of Class B felony robbery, and Class D felony criminal mischief under cause number 75C01-1112-FA-16 (“FA-16”). In return the State dismissed all other pending cases. On May 17, 2012, the trial court sentenced Hummel to thirty-one and one-half years, as agreed in the plea agreement.
On December 14, 2015, Hummel filed a petition for PCR. On March 23, 2016, Hummel filed a motion for recusal of judge. On June 16, 2016, the trial court granted that motion and appointed Special Judge Michael Shurn.
On February 24, 2017, at 1:30 p.m., at the evidentiary hearing on Hummel’s petition, Hummel and the State indicated they had come to an agreement modifying Hummel’s sentence to include Purposeful Incarceration. In exchange, Hummel requested his petition for PCR be dismissed. Special Judge Shurn accepted the agreement and dismissed the PCR. Special Judge Shurn left the court room. At 2:22 p.m., approximately forty-five minutes later, Special Judge Shurn returned to the court room. … Special Judge Shurn informed the parties he had only been appointed to preside over the PCR case and that he did not have the authority to modify the sentence in FA-16. Special Judge Shurn then revoked his approval of the agreement and reinstated Hummel’s PCR case.
On March 20, 2017, Hummel filed a motion to correct error alleging Special Judge Shurn did have the authority to accept the agreement between him and the State. In his motion, Hummel argued our Indiana Supreme Court had held that post-conviction courts had the authority to accept agreements made between the State and a petitioner. …
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Hummel argues Indiana Supreme Court precedent gives a PCR court the authority to accept such agreements between the State and PCR petitioners. Hummel notes our Indiana Supreme Court explained:
Indiana prosecutors and petitioners for post-conviction relief do resolve post- conviction relief claims on terms that include a sentence different than that imposed at trial (1) prior to adjudication, and (2) after adjudication but prior to resolution on appeal. There are sound policy reasons that our system should permit prosecutors and petitioners for post-conviction relief to agree to resolve post-conviction relief claims…
Johnston v. Dobeski, 739 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 2000) …
In Jackson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans. denied, Jackson argued post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and thus the “post-conviction court had no discretion to deny his proffered agreement[.]” However, a panel of our court held that while a post-conviction court has the authority to accept such an agreement, “because a post-conviction proceeding is not the equivalent of a civil proceeding[,]” id. at 1166, the postconviction court was not required to accept any agreement.
In light of that precedent, we are constrained to hold that a post-conviction court has the authority to accept sentence modification agreements reached by the State and a post-conviction petitioner that call for the dismissal of the postconviction petition in exchange for a sentence modification. See Johnston, 739 N.E.2d at 126 …
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Despite this precedent in favor of Hummel’s position, the State argues Special Judge Shurn did not have authority to accept the agreement to modify the sentence in FA-16 but rather only had the authority to grant or deny the relief sought by Hummel in his petition for post-conviction relief. …
However, to accept the State’s argument appears to eliminate the possibility that a special judge could ever preside over a PCR action. A PCR action, by its very design, is a collateral attack on the results of a criminal case that arose under a separate cause number. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1. Thus, the presiding judge in a PCR action must have authority to act in such a way that does, in fact, have repercussions for the outcome of a different cause number—in this case, the underlying criminal proceeding. Whether that judge is a special judge or a conventional judge ought not impact that authority.
Our Indiana Supreme Court has held a PCR court has the authority to accept agreements presented to it that modify the sentence in the underlying criminal case, see Johnston, and we now hold that the authority vested in the judge presiding over a PCR action must be the same, whether that judge is an elected judge, a judge pro tempore, or a special judge.
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… Special Judge Shurn had the authority to accept the agreement between the State and Hummel, and the State is bound by the terms of that agreement. Therefore, we reverse the post-conviction court’s revocation of its acceptance of the agreement, which also called for dismissal of Hummel’s PCR petition. We remand for the postconviction court to re-enter its original order enforcing the parties’ agreement and dismissing Hummel’s PCR petition.
Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.