Brown, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Cynthia Morrison (“Morrison”), individually and on behalf of Ernest Morrison (“Ernest”), deceased, appeals from the trial court’s order that the case be transferred from Marion County to Monroe County. We affirm.
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Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) allows a case to be filed in any county in Indiana. Id. However, the rule also sets forth criteria establishing ten “preferred” venues. Id. at 196-197…
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Morrison argues that Marion County is a county of preferred venue under Trial Rule 75(A)(4). She contends that, pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Am. Family Ins. Co., the registered agent and office of a domestic corporation provide the basis for venue under Rule 75(A)(4), that the address of Bloomington Hospital’s registered agent was an address in Marion County, and thus that Marion County is a county of preferred venue. Morrison also argues that the complaint was filed on December 20, 2017, that venue is determined as of the time the complaint was filed, and that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, which became effective on January 1, 2018, does not apply to this case. [Footnote omitted.]
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We find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) is applicable in this case. The statute provides in part: “The address of the agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity.” This Court has stated that the venue status of a county is determined when an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. See Painters Dist. Council 91, 906 N.E.2d at 257 (citing Shelton v. Wick, 715 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). Also, statutes generally will not be applied retroactively absent strong and compelling reasons. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel & Servs., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003). However, an exception to this general rule exists for remedial or procedural statutes. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002)). Although statutes and rules that are procedural or remedial may be applied retroactively, they are not required to be. Id. A remedial statute is intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute and will be applied retroactively to carry out its legislative purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional guaranty. Bourbon Mini-Mart, 783 N.E.2d at 260.
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Further, we do not find Morrison’s argument that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is ineffective under Trial Rule 75(D) to be persuasive. Trial Rule 75(D) provides in part: “Any provision of these rules and any special or general statute relating to venue, the place of trial or the authority of the court to hear the case shall be subject to this rule, and the provisions of any statute fixing more stringent rules thereon shall be ineffective.” As explained above, Trial Rule 75(A)(4) provides that preferred venue lies in the county where “the principal office of a defendant organization” is located, and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 provides that the address of the registered agent does not determine venue. Thus, Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 does not, by its express terms, fix more stringent rules related to venue than the terms of Trial Rule 75(A)(4).
To the extent Am. Family Ins. Co. may have determined that the term “principal office” in subsection (4) of the rule referred to a domestic corporation’s “registered office,” that determination was premised on Indiana corporation law which has since been considerably amended…Thus the Indiana corporation law upon which Am. Family Ins. Co. was centered has been extensively amended, and the specific statutory provision relied upon in that case has been repealed and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4- 12 has been added. We decline to find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12’s provision that the address of a registered agent does not determine venue fixes a more stringent rule related to venue than Trial Rule 75 or is ineffective pursuant to Trial Rule 75(D).
Pursuant to Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, the address of Bloomington Hospital’s registered agent does not determine venue and Marion County is not a county of preferred venue for purposes of Trial Rule 75(A)(4) on that basis. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s order that the case be transferred to the Monroe Superior Court.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s February 19, 2018 Order Granting Transfer of Venue.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.