Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
Nathan Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Class D felony. Following his release from the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), the DOC required Healey to register as a sex offender, even though Healey did not plead to the circumstances in which criminal confinement constitutes a sex offense. Having registered as a sex offender in the years since his release, Healey brought this declaratory judgment action seeking relief from the DOC’s determination that he must register as a sex offender. The trial court denied Healey’s petition along with a subsequent motion to correct errors. Healey now appeals raising the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in denying his petition for declaratory relief. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.
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Healey claims the trial court erred in concluding “that it did not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of a sex offender registration decision made by the [DOC].”…
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Applied here, these statutes mean the trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve Healey’s constitutional claim alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. … Therefore, to the extent the trial court’s order can be read to the contrary, it is erroneous.
Having established the trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over Healey’s claim, we proceed to its merits….
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First, we note Healey has failed to provide authority, or cogent argument, for the proposition that Apprendi and its progeny extend beyond judicial factfinding… The issue presented here is not one of judicial fact-finding but rather a determination of the DOC pursuant to SORA.
Secondly, we are unconvinced Healey’s registration requirement constitutes a penalty or punishment for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment… Therefore, we conclude Healey’s registration requirement was a collateral consequence of his conviction for criminal confinement and not a penalty or punishment for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-42-3-3(a)(1) (2007)…
Although the criminal confinement statute provided for an enhancement from a Class D felony to a Class C felony where the victim of the crime was “less than fourteen (14) years of age and is not the confining or removing person’s child,” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(A) (2006), the legislature included the entire criminal confinement statute when defining both “sex offender” and “sex or violent offender.” Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5(a)(12) (2007); Ind. Code § 11-8-8- 5(a)(12) (2007). As discussed above, our legislature delegated administrative authority over SORA to the DOC, see Ind. Code § 11-8-2-12.4 (listing duties of the DOC), and the DOC is required to maintain the sex offender registry, Ind. Code §§ 11-8-2-12.4(1)-(2), (5); 11-8-2-13. Having included the requirements that criminal confinement constitutes a sex offense for purposes of the registry only when the “victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age, and the person who confined or removed the victim is not the victim’s parent or guardian,” under Title 11 of the Indiana Code, our legislature delegated the authority to make the necessary factual determination to the DOC. Ind. Code § 11-8-8- 4.5(a)(12) (2007); Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5(a)(12) (2007). Quite simply, Healey pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, his victim was less than eighteen years old, and Healey was not the victim’s parent or guardian; therefore, “[p]lacement on the Registry is mandatory, and the Act affords neither the trial court nor the DOC any discretion in the matter of the registration requirements.” Nichols v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Comingled with his Sixth Amendment claim, Healey argues there were insufficient facts to warrant his registration requirement where the underlying charging information only provided the initials of the victim without providing the victim’s age or relationship to Healey. As concluded above, because Healey’s registration requirement was a collateral consequence to his conviction without Sixth Amendment implications, there was no constitutional requirement that he plead guilty to every fact warranting his registration requirement. Even in the absence of a constitutional requirement, however, the DOC cannot arbitrarily and capriciously designate sex offenders, and Healey contends the record is insufficient to support his designation. We conclude the record contained sufficient information for the DOC to determine Healey’s registration requirement.
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We agree with the reasoning of the Nichols court. Healey pleaded guilty to the requisite crime of criminal confinement and admitted that Z.M. was the victim of the crime. Accordingly, Healey’s registration requirement was “a consequence of the operation of the Act itself,” id. at 1017, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Healey’s motion to correct error seeking to have declaratory judgment granted in his favor.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve Healey’s constitutional claim and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Healey’s petition for declaratory judgment.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.