Bailey, J.
Case Summary
A.B. (“Mother”) challenges the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights as to her five children who had previously been adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”): Z.B., D.B., L.B., Me.B., (the “Siblings”) and Ma.B (collectively, the “Children”). [Footnote omitted.] Notably, the Delaware County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) opposed terminating Mother’s parental rights with respect to Ma.B., but Ma.B’s court-appointed special advocates (the “CASAs”) pursued termination through counsel. Mother now presents the following consolidated and restated issues:
I. Whether a CASA has the statutory authority to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights when DCS opposes termination; and
II. Whether there is sufficient evidence supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
We affirm, but remand for correction of certain scrivener’s errors.
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Mother and DCS present what appears to be an issue of first impression: whether a CASA has the statutory authority to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights when DCS opposes termination….
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It is clear that a CASA may sign and file a petition to terminate parental rights when a child has been adjudicated a CHINS…Moreover, it is equally clear that DCS represents the State’s interests in termination proceedings: “Upon the filing of a petition under section 4 of this chapter, the attorney for the department shall represent the interests of the state in all subsequent proceedings on the petition.” I.C. § 31-35-2-5.
Mother and DCS read these statutes as prohibiting proceedings on a petition to terminate parental rights whenever DCS opposes the petition. They argue that DCS should not be burdened with involvement in termination proceedings that the State does not support. DCS further argues that letting a “CASA prosecute a termination petition is tantamount to letting a child prosecute a termination case against his or her parents.” DCS Br. at 29. DCS also directs us to caselaw in the adoption context where we have strictly construed statutes to preserve the parent-child relationship in light of the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship. See In re K.F., 935 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [Footnote omitted.] The CASAs respond that because the legislature specifically authorized them to independently initiate termination proceedings, it follows that they can also independently prosecute these matters.
We agree with the CASAs. An authorization to file a petition cannot be reasonably read to prohibit prosecuting that petition, and this plain reading in no way affects the elements or burden of proof for termination. Moreover, our legislature specifically created a mechanism for DCS—or a guardian ad litem or a CASA—to express opposition to a petition to terminate parental rights. That is, any “person described in section 4(a)” may—as DCS did here—file a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting “a compelling reason, based on facts and circumstances stated in the petition or motion, for concluding that filing, or proceeding to a final determination of, a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship is not in the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1). That motion may be successful, but when it is not, we discern no impediment to proceeding with the petition to terminate parental rights. Thus, there was no error based upon DCS’s opposition to the petition concerning Ma.B.
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Because a CASA has the statutory authority to independently prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights, it was not improper for the CASAs to prosecute the petition concerning Ma.B. while DCS opposed termination. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights as to the Children. However, we are remanding for correction of scrivener’s errors in the orders pertaining to D.B., L.B., and Me.B.
Affirmed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.