Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Kathy Dotson appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Stryker Corporation (“Stryker”), Brad Bolinger, Patrick Reagan, Dr. Jeffrey M. Sheedy, Rochester Orthopedics, P.C. (“Rochester”), and Woodlawn Hospital (“Woodlawn”). Dotson raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it considered Dotson’s deposition on summary judgment when Dotson had not reviewed or signed her deposition at the time of its designation.
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On appeal from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, Dotson first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered her designated deposition. [Footnote omitted.] Specifically, Dotson contends that her designated deposition was inadmissible because she had not yet read and signed the deposition transcript when the defendants designated it in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. [Footnote omitted.] Although the deposition was designated on summary judgment rather than published at trial, the trial court still had “broad discretion in ruling” on the admissibility of the evidence. Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1138 n.5 (Ind. 2014). An abuse of that discretion “occurs only where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).
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Dotson has not demonstrated that the trial court’s reliance on the designated deposition was so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion. The Court in Drummond held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on an unsigned deposition after the witness had been given the opportunity to sign the deposition transcript but did not do so. Here, while the deposition was unreviewed and unsigned at the time of its designation, there is no dispute that Dotson was subsequently given the opportunity to read and sign it, which she did. And she did so well before the court’s hearing and order on the motions for summary judgment, even if the trial court did not rely on the signed deposition when it entered its order. That is, by the time the trial court actually heard and ruled on the motions for summary judgment, Dotson’s formal approval of the original deposition transcript was not an issue.
And the substantive accuracy of the designated deposition, at least as it related to the statute of limitations issue, was not seriously in dispute despite the fact that the designated version had been prematurely filed with the court. [Footnote omitted.] Just as the complaining party in Gallagher was unable to demonstrate any inaccuracy in the substance of the unsigned deposition, Dotson also has not shown any inaccuracy in the designated deposition insofar as it was used to demonstrate a lapse in the statute of limitations. Despite her bald assertions to the contrary in her brief on appeal, our review of the designated deposition and her subsequent errata sheets reveal that her corrections had no bearing on her testimony as it related to the statute of limitations issue.
Still, Dotson argues that, on summary judgment, the trial court “is limited to the designated evidence.” See Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013). That is a correct statement, but Dotson has not shown either that the trial court did otherwise or that, if it did, the court committed reversible error in doing so. Again, the designated deposition and the signed deposition were substantively identical on the dispositive statute of limitations issue.
Dotson also argues that it would be “unjust to allow the moving party to designate evidence . . . if the evidence was not admissible when it was designated because it would require the non-moving party to speculate whether it would be admissible when responding . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 18. We cannot agree. Parties frequently consider and plan for the likelihood that arguably inadmissible evidence might nonetheless get into the record. Moreover, Dotson’s argument that the designated deposition should be inadmissible based solely on the timing of her signature to it seeks to elevate form over substance, which we will not do. E.g., Moryl, 4 N.E.3d at 1139. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to strike the designated deposition.
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Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.