David, J.
We are asked to resolve whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple felony resisting law enforcement charges when those charges stem from a single incident of resisting. For reasons discussed herein, we find that Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 authorizes only one conviction for felony resisting law enforcement where the defendant engages in a single act of resisting while operating a vehicle that causes multiple deaths. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for revised sentencing.
On the evening of February 2, 2016, Indiana Police State Trooper James Manning (“Trooper Manning”) was parked on the northbound shoulder of I-69, near Petersburg, Indiana. A motorist pulled over and informed Trooper Manning that he observed a blue Chevy Tahoe driving northbound on the southbound lanes of the interstate. Trooper Manning activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency signals—the lights and siren— and gave chase, driving northbound on I-69. Shortly thereafter, he spotted a blue SUV driving on the wrong side of the road. Officers later learned that Brian L. Paquette was driving that vehicle.
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Trooper Manning followed in pursuit and Paquette continued southbound, driving between two northbound lanes. Within two miles of making the U-turn, Paquette’s SUV collided head-on with Molinet’s Ford Focus, striking the passenger side where Kapperman was seated. Molinet, Kapperman, and Kapperman’s unborn child died as a result of the crash. The impact of the collision caused Paquette’s Chevy Tahoe to flip over and land on the driver’s side of the Lowe’s vehicle, instantly killing Jason Lowe.
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The State charged Paquette with a total of eleven offenses. Among those were three counts for each of the following: resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death, a Level 3 felony; operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing death, a Level 4 felony; and reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony. Each duplicative count related to one of the three deceased victims. Paquette was also charged with operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his body causing serious bodily injury to Samantha Lowe, a Level 6 felony; and possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.
Paquette agreed to plead guilty to all charges, but reserved the right to ask the court to enter only one conviction and sentence for the felony resisting law enforcement charge. Paquette argued that he engaged in only one act of resisting, thus conviction on all three resisting law enforcement felony charges—one for each deceased victim—violated a state and federal prohibition on double-jeopardy. On that issue, the trial court ruled against Paquette, finding that conviction and sentence on all three counts of resisting law enforcement was not barred by double jeopardy protections.
The trial court then entered convictions on all three Level 3 felony counts of resisting law enforcement and on the charge of operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing serious bodily injury. The court merged the remaining counts into the four aforementioned counts. For each of the three felony resisting law enforcement convictions, the trial court imposed 16-year sentences to be served consecutively. For the operating while intoxicated conviction, Paquette received a 2.5-year sentence to be served consecutively with the resisting sentences. In total, Paquette was to serve fifty-and-a-half years executed.
Paquette appealed, making a statutory argument instead of a constitutional one. He argued that, as written, Indiana’s resisting law enforcement statute authorizes only one conviction for each act of resisting and that the trial court, therefore, erred when it entered three convictions and sentences against him. Relying on its own precedent in Armstead v. State, 549 N.E.2d 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for revised sentencing. It held that the legislature intended only one conviction for each act of resisting, and since Paquette had only engaged in one act of resisting when he fled using a vehicle, he could be convicted of only one count of felony resisting law enforcement. Paquette v. State, 79 N.E.3d 932, 935-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
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In relevant part, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 states that a person commits the crime of resisting law enforcement when he “knowingly or intentionally . . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself . . . and ordered the person to stop.”
Resisting law enforcement is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, but subsection (b) provides several exceptions. Notably, under paragraph (b)(3), the offense becomes a Level 3 felony if, while resisting law enforcement as described in subsection (a), “the person operates a vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person . . .” Paquette’s three counts for Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement relate to three victims killed as a result of his flight.
Whether Paquette resisted law enforcement was not the basis for the Court of Appeals’ reversal and is not in dispute today. … Instead, the Court of Appeals’ reversal hinged on its interpretation of the relevant statute. It held that Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 authorizes only one conviction where the offense stems from a single act of resisting law enforcement. “Because Paquette engaged in only one act of resisting,” the Court of Appeals found that “he [could] be convicted and sentenced on only one count of resisting law enforcement.” Paquette, 79 N.E.3d at 936.
The State challenges the Court of Appeals’ holding, proposing a different interpretation of the statute. It argues that the trial court was correct in entering judgment on three counts of resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that caused death—one count for each deceased victim—because the legislature intended multiple convictions for multiple deaths resulting from the same act of resisting. Recognizing that our Court of Appeals is split on this issue, we granted transfer.
Our Court of Appeals relied heavily on Armstead, 549 N.E.2d at 400 to find that Paquette could not be convicted of multiple felony resisting law enforcement charges where a single act of resisting law enforcement led to multiple deaths. …
… When Armstead was decided, the resisting law enforcement statute was codified in Indiana Code section 35-44-3-3. The structure of the relevant subsections was essentially the same as it is now. The clause making it a felony to resist law enforcement while “operat[ing] a vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person” was added as paragraph (b)(3) in 1993, see P.L. 248-1993, § 1, but its language is substantially similar to portions of the statute in the earlier version considered by the Armstead court. …
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The critical language—“another person”—left open the possibility that serious bodily injury incurred by innocent by-standers could be the basis for a felony enhancement of a resisting law enforcement charge. Meanwhile, the portion of the statute that served to enhance Paquette’s conviction shares the “other person” language that existed in the very paragraph the Armstead court considered. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the State that Armstead is inapplicable or that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on its own holding was entirely misplaced.
Turning to the heart of the issue, we find that the resisting law enforcement statute, as written, was intended to permit only one conviction for each act of resisting, even where multiple deaths are caused by use of a vehicle.
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Ultimately, we find unpersuasive the State’s contention that the legislature intended to create an independent criminal offense for each person killed when a defendant resists law enforcement using a vehicle. Nothing about the structure or language of the statute creates a new or independent offense and our inquiry into other similar statutes confirms our reading of Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1. …
Since our legislature has drafted the resisting law enforcement statute without such explicit authorization and has otherwise remained silent, we glean its intent to allow only one resisting law enforcement conviction for each act of resisting. … To find otherwise would require us to engraft language into a statute, which we have repeatedly said we may not do. … Accordingly, we find that Paquette could not be convicted of multiple resisting law enforcement charges stemming from a single act of resisting.
… Accordingly, we reverse the trial court as to two of the three convictions for felony resisting law enforcement. Since one of Paquette’s other offenses allows for multiple convictions based on a single act of operating a vehicle, we remand for the trial court to enter convictions under that statute for all victims and instruct the trial court to sentence accordingly.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.