Goff, J.
This case arises from a tragic accident where an uninsured driver under the influence of methamphetamine struck and killed Brian Harris who was mowing his home’s lawn near the roadside. Harris’s estate sought uninsured motorist benefits under his employer’s commercial auto policy, claiming he qualified for coverage under the policy term “others we protect.” The insurance company denied the claim, finding Harris was not entitled to coverage under the policy, and the parties litigated the matter to our courthouse door.
Ostensibly, the issue before us remains whether the policy term “others we protect” included Harris. But unpacking this broader issue reveals a narrower, threshold one—whether “others we protect” is ambiguous and amenable to judicial interpretation. Harris’s estate urges that because the term “others we protect” is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations it represents an ambiguous term in need of judicial construction and must be construed in the estate’s favor. Meanwhile, the insurance company insists that, because a separate policy section entitled OTHERS WE PROTECT explains who qualifies as “others we protect,” the term is unambiguous and impervious to judicial construction. We agree with the insurance company and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment.
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This matter involves whether Formco’s commercial auto policy provides coverage for Harris’s death in a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured motorist, when Harris was not occupying a scheduled vehicle. The parties agree this case presents no genuine issue of material fact, and presents only one legal question, that is, the meaning of one term in the Policy’s UM Endorsement—“others we protect.”
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So this case narrows to one dispositive legal question: whether Harris qualified as “others we protect” in the Policy’s UM Endorsement. On this question the parties disagree and present us with two opposing interpretations for “others we protect.” In simplest terms, the Estate’s offered meaning includes Harris while Erie’s does not. But before we can interpret the policy and thereby endorse either party’s proposed meaning, there is a necessary threshold inquiry: whether “others we protect” is an ambiguous term amenable to judicial construction.
I. Indiana law instructs that courts may construe only ambiguous policy terms and provisions.
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II. The policy term “others we protect” is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, so it is not ambiguous and not subject to judicial construction.
As for the Policy here, the parties present two differing interpretations for “others we protect.” On one hand, Erie insists “others we protect” carries the meaning outlined in the OTHERS WE PROTECT section directly beneath the OUR PROMISE section, therefore making the phrase unambiguous and impervious to judicial construction. At first blush, this interpretation seems reasonable.
On the other hand, the Estate reasons that “others we protect” includes “individuals such as Mr. Harris who were specifically listed in the Erie Policy for purposes of protection and coverage.” While this proposed interpretation appears initially to be a reasonable one, it simply is not reasonable because it requires OTHERS WE PROTECT to mean something different from “others we protect.” To be sure, this proposed interpretation depends upon the premise that the separate OTHERS WE PROTECT section cannot and does not define the phrase “others we protect” in the OUR PROMISE section because “others we protect” does not meet the criteria for defined terms—it is not bolded and does not appear in a DEFINITIONS section. The Estate’s interpretation, therefore, imputes a separate meaning to OTHERS WE PROTECT, specifically that the separate section identifies remote claimants who might be entitled to UMBI benefits even though they are neither “you” (i.e., Formco) nor “others we protect” (i.e., listed drivers like Harris).
Faced with these competing proposed interpretations, we must assess whether both are reasonable from the standpoint of an ordinary policyholder before diving into judicial construction. We consider each interpretation in turn.
A. It is reasonable to conclude that OTHERS WE PROTECT gives meaning to “others we protect.”
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B. The Estate’s proposed interpretation for “others we protect” is unreasonable.
As for the Estate’s twofold view that the phrase “others we protect” includes scheduled drivers like Harris while OTHERS WE PROTECT identifies additional remote claimants that are neither “you” nor “others we protect,” we find that proposed interpretation unreasonable on two fronts.
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Since we have not been presented with two reasonable interpretations of “others we protect,” as a matter of law, we cannot say the phrase is ambiguous, and we cannot judicially construe it. Instead, we move forward in our analysis by giving “others we protect” its plain meaning as found in the OTHERS WE PROTECT explanatory section.
III. Under these facts and circumstances, the Estate cannot receive UMBI benefits based on Harris’s death.
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Conclusion
Brian Harris died in a tragic, senseless accident, and his Estate understandably sought UMBI compensation from Erie to fill the resulting financial void. But despite the sympathy we have for the Estate and despite Erie’s unartful policy drafting—we simply cannot say that “others we protect” is an ambiguous term amenable to judicial interpretation. The UM Endorsement itself explains to policyholders who may qualify as “others we protect” by including an illustrative list in a prominently displayed, stand-alone section entitled OTHERS WE PROTECT. And so we believe ordinary policyholders could not honestly disagree as to the term’s meaning. They would agree that the OTHERS WE PROTECT section gives meaning to “others we protect,” rather than creating a third group of remote claimants.
Because we find the disputed policy term “others we protect” unambiguous, we cannot construe it and must give it the plain meaning found within the UM Endorsement. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Brian Harris did not qualify as “others we protect” under the UM Endorsement in his employer’s commercial auto policy when he was tragically struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. We hold the trial court erred in finding otherwise and in granting summary judgment to the Estate. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for Erie.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.