Baker, J.
Erica Manis (Mother) appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to terminate Trista McNabb’s (Guardian) guardianship of her child, J.F. (Child), and its denial of her request for parenting time. She argues that the trial court erred by denying her petition to terminate the guardianship because the evidence showed that she was able to care for Child and that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked authority to order parenting time for Mother. Finding that the trial court did not err by denying Mother’s petition to terminate the guardianship, but that the trial court erred by refusing to consider Mother’s request for parenting time, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
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Mother next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked statutory or other authority to determine parenting time for Mother.
The issue of whether a trial court has statutory or other authority to determine and order parenting time for a parent whose child is placed with a guardian is a matter of first impression. [Footnote omitted.] While no statute explicitly grants trial courts this authority in guardianship proceedings, no statute precludes it, either. And because our General Assembly has clearly intended for noncustodial parents to have parenting time unless it would endanger or impair the physical or mental health of the child, we find that a trial court has the authority to determine and order parenting time for a parent whose child is placed with a guardian.
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Thus, our General Assembly clearly intended for parents to have parenting time, barring exceptional circumstances, when the parent and child do not live together. Despite the lack of a statute explicitly addressing parenting time for a parent whose child has been placed with a guardian, parenting time for such a parent is indisputably within the realm of what our General Assembly envisioned when considering the rights of a parent and the best interests of the child. A trial court that orders parenting time for such a parent is, therefore, effecting the legislature’s intent. Accordingly, we hold that a trial court has the authority to determine whether parenting time is warranted and order reasonable parenting time for a parent whose child is placed with a guardian. In so doing, a trial court must balance a parent’s right to visit his or her child with the best interests of the child. And in ordering parenting time in these cases, it would be best practice for a trial court “to make specific findings to support its parenting time order.” Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 765.
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We cannot state strongly enough that a trial court should not allow a third party alone to determine a parent’s parenting time with his or her child during guardianship proceedings. If parties cannot agree on their own to a plan that is in the best interests of the child, then the trial court must take an active role in developing one. See Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § II(A) (“When the parties cannot reach an agreement on a parenting plan, the specific provisions which follow are designed to assist parents and the court in the development of a parenting plan. They represent the minimum recommended time a parent should have to maintain frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with a child”) (emphasis added). We reverse the trial court’s order that it cannot determine parenting time for Mother and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.