Sharpnack, S.J.
Statement of the Case
After a fire took the lives of Lillian Parsley’s daughter and grandson, she sought wrongful death damages. She brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order that granted MGA Family Group, Inc., H Properties LLP, and Mark Snedeker’s (collectively, “the Defendants”) motion to dismiss the wrongful death action that Lillian initiated as to her grandson. We affirm.
Issue
The issue Lillian presents for our review (consolidated and restated) is whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss her wrongful death action as to her grandson.
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Our General Assembly has enacted a statute that provides an action for the wrongful death of a child and specifies who may maintain such an action…The only provision under which Lillian could maintain an action is (c)(3) as “a guardian, for the injury or death of a protected person.” Id.
Lillian argues she has standing to bring an action under the CWDS because at the time of Robert’s death, she was Robert’s “‘de facto custodian’” and “qualifie[d]” as his guardian, as contemplated by the CWDS, as she was “the person who provided all of the financial, housing, clothing and other physical needs of [Robert].” Appellant’s Br. pp. 9, 16. Lillian contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim because it misinterpreted the meaning of the term “guardian.” According to Lillian, the trial court interpreted the term in an overly narrow manner when it concluded that the term meant only a legal guardian or court-appointed guardian. Per Lillian, the court’s interpretation is inconsistent with our General Assembly’s intent to give phrases their plain and ordinary meaning, and that if the term is given its plain and ordinary meaning, she would qualify as Robert’s guardian and have standing to bring her claim. She also argues the trial court’s decision is contrary to Indiana’s public policy and “results in an unjustly harsh outcome not intended by the Indiana Legislature.” Id. at 10.
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Lillian cannot maintain an action under the CWDS unless she qualifies as Robert’s guardian. See I.C. § 34-23-2-1. As such, at issue in this case is the meaning of the term “guardian” as used in the CWDS, which necessitates a determination of the statutory meaning of the term “guardian” to resolve the following: whether someone like Lillian, who without court intervention provides care and financial support to another, comes within the statutory definition of the term.
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Examining the statutes that define the term “guardian” and “protected person” and applying those definitions to the CWDS, it is apparent that our General Assembly intended a guardian to be someone appointed by the court to be responsible for the care of a particular person or that person’s property. Lillian was never appointed by a court to be Robert’s guardian. Although it is clear Lillian has sustained a loss in the death of her grandson, she simply does not meet the statutory requirement to maintain an action. It is not for us to rewrite or amend the statute. As such, she does not fall within the meaning of “guardian” as contemplated by the CWDS, and she is not entitled to maintain an action under the CWDS as Robert’s guardian.
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Conclusion
Because Lillian was not Robert’s guardian as contemplated by the CWDS, she lacked standing to bring her wrongful death claim. The trial court did not err in granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed. Barnes, J., and Brown, J., concur.