Bailey, J.
While criminal charges against Cameron Hunter (“Hunter”) were pending, the State alleged that Hunter had contemptuously violated a condition of his bail. …
Hunter was released on bail during the pendency of criminal charges against him. Hunter and the State eventually reached a plea agreement, and the trial court scheduled the matter for hearing. At the hearing, Hunter sought to postpone consideration of the plea in order to determine whether he was eligible for community corrections. The State then orally sought a modification of the conditions of Hunter’s bail, to which Hunter’s counsel agreed. The court continued the hearing and orally modified the conditions of Hunter’s bail, specifying that Hunter was not to contact or “be around anyone under the age of 18.” Hunter confirmed that he had no questions about the trial court’s oral pronouncement. Hunter then left the courthouse and entered a vehicle that contained the three people he rode with to the hearing: his girlfriend, his fifteen-year-old sister, and a sixteen-year-old female. Thereafter, the State filed a petition alleging that Hunter had contemptuously violated a condition of his bail by leaving the courthouse with two minors. The trial court held a hearing on October 9, 2017, at which it determined that Hunter was in contempt. As a sanction, the court ordered Hunter to serve 180 days in jail.
Hunter argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a criminal contempt sanction for the violation of a condition of bail. We review the imposition of contempt sanctions for an abuse of discretion, Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ind. 2012) …
The instant matter arose because Hunter violated a condition of his bail, and bail procedures are controlled by the Indiana Code. … Therein, Section 35-33-8-5 sets forth a remedy for the violation of a bail condition—and that remedy is revocation of bail. Here, however, the State alleged contempt, and the trial court ultimately imposed a punitive contempt sanction. A court’s contempt power enables it to impose sanctions designed to “maintain[] its dignity, secur[e] obedience to its process and rules, rebuk[e] interference with the conduct of business, and punish[] unseemly behavior.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005). … A court may nonetheless impose a punitive contempt sanction, but only if the offending conduct amounts to “criminal” contempt—that is, when the conduct was “willful and involve[d] a deliberate design to disobey the order as an act of defiance of, and interference with, the function of the court.” Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313, 320 (1932).
Indeed, conduct amounts to punishable criminal contempt only when “directed against the dignity and authority of the court[,] . . . obstruct[ing] the administration of justice and . . . tend[ing] to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.” State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Ind. 1990).
In this case, the State presented evidence of Hunter’s violation, and argued that Hunter “defied the Court’s order” because he “proceeded to exit the building” with minors. Hunter testified that he did not know whether he was supposed to wait while his girlfriend drove the minors back and returned to pick him up, or first leave without the minors. In imposing a punitive contempt sanction, the trial court seemingly drew on Hunter’s testimony, determining that Hunter “contemptuously ignored” its orders “because to comply would have been inconvenient for him.” Yet, Hunter’s conduct did not affect the dignity or operation of the court. Thus, the conduct did not rise to the level of punishable criminal contempt.
Ultimately, Hunter failed to comply with a condition of his bail. Under such circumstances, an appropriate remedy was to revoke bail—a remedy the State should have sought in accordance with the controlling statute. See I.C. § 35-338-5. Because Hunter’s conduct did not amount to criminal contempt, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a punitive contempt sanction.
Reversed.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.