Massa, J.
Public participation is fundamental to self-government, and thus protected by the Indiana and United States Constitutions. When citizens are faced with meritless retaliatory lawsuits designed to chill their constitutional rights of petition or free speech, also known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute provides a defense.
Here, two minors and their parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against a doctor who reported suspected medical child abuse to the Department of Child Services (DCS). The doctor claimed the lawsuit was a SLAPP and her report to DCS was protected speech shielded by Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. We reverse, finding the anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable in this case because to be protected under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute a person’s actions must be “in furtherance of” his or her right of petition or free speech and “in connection with a public issue.” Ind. Code § 34-7-7-5 (2017).
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The First Amendment protects a person’s right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” and prohibits the government from “abridging the freedom of speech.” [Footnote omitted.] U.S. Const. amend. I. These traditional-American constitutional rights involve “personal expression,” and citizen participation in government. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011). Persons exercising their right of petition “express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives” with the purpose of “seeking redress of a grievance.” Id. Persons exercising their right of free speech do so to advance “the public exchange of ideas” essential to a healthy democracy. Id.
Dr. Demetris did not exercise her right to petition. Her report was not made to address a grievance of her own, but instead to simply report her diagnosis of medical child abuse to DCS. Cf. Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342, 355–56 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting an attorney who advocates on a client’s behalf is not exercising personal First Amendment rights). Similarly, once Dr. Demetris arrived at her diagnosis, she had a duty to report it or face potential criminal repercussions, inconsistent with any intent to facilitate debate. [Footnote omitted.] See Kentner v. Timothy R. Downey Ins., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (finding Indiana’s anti-SLAPP defense inapplicable where actions are “simply in furtherance of [person’s] own personal goals”); see also Kadambi v. Express Scripts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 900, 909 (N.D. Ind. 2015) (noting self-motivated communications to avoid legal liability were “inconsistent with any claimed intent to engage in public debate”). Once the report was made, Dr. Demetris fulfilled her statutory obligations and any further action was up to DCS. [Footnote omitted.]
While there may be some set of facts where a doctor’s mandated report is in furtherance of First Amendment rights, these are not it. By simply reporting her statutorily-required diagnosis to DCS, Dr. Demetris was not engaged in any political advocacy guaranteed to her under the right to petition the government.
Likewise, Dr. Demetris’s report was not made pursuant to her freespeech rights because (1) it was the product of a statutory duty, not a constitutional right; and (2) it was confidential.8 See Kadambi, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 909 (finding communications were not in furtherance of free speech rights because they were made to avoid legal liability and concerned a private matter). These aspects of the report belie any purported exchange of ideas. As our Court of Appeals explained, the First Amendment protects the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Lach v. Lake Cty., 621 N.E.2d 357, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). Dr. Demetris’s report was not speech in relation to her participation in government. Instead, the VanWinkle’s lawsuit alleged a legitimate legal wrong, medical care which they believe fell below the standard of care and resulted in damages. It was not an attempt to silence Dr. Demetris from making these types of reports or diagnoses.
B. Dr. Demetris’s report was not made in connection with a public issue. Most of the briefing in this case concerns whether child abuse is a public issue.
Dr. Demetris directs this Court to decisions from California courts, specifically Terry v. Davis Community Church, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1534 (2005) and Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal. App. 4th 357 (2011), arguing specific circumstances of child abuse are public issues. The VanWinkles argue that child abuse generally is of concern to the public, but specific, individual reports are not. They find the reasoning in Kadambi persuasive. See 86 F. Supp. 3d at 909 (finding practice of medicine and pharmacy are of great public interest on a macro level, but the case’s narrow issue involving denied patient prescriptions was not significant to the public).
As required by the anti-SLAPP statute, Dr. Demetris identified the specific public issue that prompted constitutionally-protected acts in this case as “Dr. Demetris reporting her suspicions that her patient, A.V., was the victim of medical child abuse.” [Footnote omitted.] Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p.33.
With this in mind, we note that this Court has not addressed what is or is not a “public issue” under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute, and we are doubtful an all-encompassing definition can be given. Regarding the First Amendment, we have said that speech is in connection with a matter of public concern if it is addressed to “‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as determined by its content, form, and context.” Love v. Rehfus, 946 N.E.2d 1, 9 n.6 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). We think this is a sufficient guide to determining what is a “public issue,” and courts should analyze the narrow statements at issue, avoiding a sweeping view of what is “public.” [Footnote omitted.]
While child abuse in certain instances may be an issue of public interest, it is not in this case. Here, the form of Dr. Demetris’s report was confidential, including content specific to one minor, A.V., and potential abuse by her parents. We agree with Dr. Demetris that child abuse reporting is of general public interest and, indeed, to further that interest the legislature has provided immunity to those who report. But that does not make every report a newsworthy event, particularly when the substance of the report is confidential and concerns a private matter. See Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, based on the narrow content, form, and context of this report—medical child abuse of one child—it was not a matter of public concern.
Conclusion
Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute was adopted in response to the discrete problem of retaliatory lawsuits aimed at chilling constitutional rights. The VanWinkles’ lawsuit “is not the type of lawsuit that the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent” because it was not filed to stifle Dr. Demetris’s “speech on a public issue or an issue of public interest,” but to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice. Id. Thus, we reverse, and remand for consideration of the stayed issues. [Footnote omitted.]
Rush, C.J., and David and Goff, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., not participating.