Massa, J.
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In April 2014, an anonymous tipster alerted the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department of a possible marijuana grow operation at a private residence located at 5926 North Crittenden Avenue. …
Acting on this information, IMPD Detective Sergeant Kerry Buckner investigated the home, first verifying its color and address. While conducting daytime surveillance, the detective noted several windows with dark coverings and two air-conditioning units on the upper floor independent of the home’s central air system. At night, the detective observed a “high intensity glow” emitting from an upstairs covered window. …
Having partially corroborated the informant’s tips, Detective Buckner then requested a search warrant for a “forward looking infrared” (FLIR) device, an aircraft-mounted thermal imaging camera used “to detect the presence of a heat signature commensurate with an indoor marijuana growing operation.” …
Upon approval of the FLIR warrant, Detective Michael Condon and Sergeant Edwin Andresen executed the thermal-imaging search. During the inspection, Detective Condon reported an atypical heat signature emanating from the home. Armed with this supplemental evidence, Detective Buckner requested and received a second warrant to search the physical premises. …
A search of the house revealed an extensive marijuana grow operation, resulting in the seizure of 180 individual plants, heat lamps, plant fertilizer, dehydrators, drying racks, and deodorizing machines. Police arrested McGrath and the State charged him with one count of dealing in marijuana and one count of marijuana possession, both Class D felonies.
At trial, McGrath moved to suppress the seized evidence, challenging the search warrants under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. …
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, admitted the seized evidence over McGrath’s objection, and found McGrath guilty as charged. The court stayed McGrath’s sentencing pending appeal.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed McGrath’s conviction, finding the first search warrant lacked probable cause due to insufficient evidence corroborating the informant’s allegation of criminal activity. McGrath v. State, 81 N.E.3d 655, 668–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated. The majority concluded that the detective’s training and experience, “[h]owever impeccable,” was insufficient to convert the innocuous circumstances he observed—the window coverings, the A/C units, and the distinct lighting—into objective factors establishing probable cause of criminal activity. …
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A probable-cause affidavit “need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant” but may instead rely on hearsay information. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) …
Of course, not all hearsay amounts to probable cause. To the contrary, there must be some “reliable information establishing the credibility of the source” and “a factual basis for the information furnished.” I.C. § 35-33-52(b)(1). Alternatively, a probable-cause affidavit must contain information that, under the totality of the circumstances, corroborates the hearsay. Id. § 35-33-5-2(b)(2).
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McGrath first argues that, because Detective Buckner failed to detect the odor of marijuana near the home, the affidavit supporting the FLIR warrant lacked sufficient evidence to corroborate the anonymous tip of criminal activity. …
The State counters that the window coverings, the A/C units, and the distinct lighting—taken together—proved sufficiently indicative of a marijuana grow operation to establish probable cause of criminal activity. …
We agree with the State.
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Here, the informant reported having observed the criminal activity firsthand, thus entitling the tip to “greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234; id. at 268 n.20 …
Detective Buckner then conducted an independent investigation to confirm the street address, the color of the house, the names of the occupants, and the bright light. We acknowledge that some of these facts were plainly evident. See Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 362 (Ind. 2006) …
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… When viewed collectively, and in the context of Detective Buckner’s training and experience, these facts are sufficiently indicative of a marijuana grow operation.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13 (innocent activity or behavior will often establish a basis for probable cause).
We thus conclude that a “substantial basis” existed to support the magistrate’s decision to issue the FLIR warrant.
Next, McGrath argues that the second probable-cause affidavit fails for lack of information corroborating Detective Condon’s hearsay observations of the FLIR search. …
The State counters that an independent corroboration of Detective Condon’s statements was unnecessary. Rather, the State insists, Detective Buckner properly relied on information from a fellow officer under the collective-knowledge doctrine. …
Again, we agree with the State.
The collective- or imputed-knowledge doctrine is well settled in Indiana and, contrary to McGrath’s assertion, applies to both investigative stops and search warrants. See State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied…
Unlike the hearsay requirement of the warrant statute, designed to ensure an informant’s veracity, the collective-knowledge doctrine presumes a fellow officer’s credibility, thus “no special showing of reliability need be made as a part of the probable cause determination.” …
In his second affidavit, Detective Buckner clearly stated that he had applied for and received a warrant to conduct the FLIR search. He further specified that Detective Condon and Sergeant Andresen executed the search, the results of which—according to Condon and as related by Detective Buckner—revealed a heat signature consistent with an indoor marijuana grow operation. While the affidavit failed to disclose Detective Condon’s training and experience, the magistrate could reasonably have inferred the detective’s expertise in conducting the FLIR search based on Detective Buckner’s tacit endorsement of his fellow-officer’s work. …
Finally, the absence of a statement detailing the accuracy of the FLIR device, or the method by which it operates, is of no consequence here. Evidence of probable cause—whether based on an anonymous tip or an officer’s technological tools—need not meet the more rigorous standard of proof in establishing guilt. See State v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied…
For the reasons above, we conclude that the second magistrate had a “substantial basis” for issuing the warrant to search the physical premises of McGrath’s residence.
Because we find that probable cause supported both warrants, we affirm the trial court’s decision to uphold the rulings of both magistrates.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.