Vaidik, CJ.
With some exceptions, Criminal Rule 4(C) guarantees a defendant the right to stand trial within one year of arrest or the date charges are filed, whichever is later. If, during the one-year period, the trial court sets a trial date beyond the one-year period, the defendant is obligated to object in time for the court to reset the trial for a date within the one-year period, otherwise he acquiesces to the date. When a defendant fails to object timely, he cannot then move for discharge under Rule 4(C) when the one-year period expires.
In this case, 20 days before the one-year period was to expire, the court held a pretrial conference and set Myers’s trial for a date beyond the one-year period. Myers did not object. Nevertheless, shortly after the period had expired, Myers moved for discharge under Rule 4(C), which the trial court granted. The State appeals and argues that by failing to object during the one-year period, Myers acquiesced to the trial date and waived his motion for discharge. …
On December 3, 2015, the State charged Myers with three counts of drunk driving. As a result of numerous delays, some of which were attributable to Myers, the case was still pending in 2017. On May 26, 2017, the trial court held a pretrial conference at which a trial date was to be set. As of that date, 20 days remained in the one-year period under Rule 4(C)—that is, the State had until June 15 to bring Myers to trial. But when the trial court asked if there was any Rule 4(C) issue, neither attorney raised any such concern. The trial was then scheduled for November 14, 2017, without objection from either side.
On June 23, after the one-year period had expired, Myers filed a motion for discharge under Rule 4(C), explaining:
At the May 26, 2017 telephonic pretrial, Defense Counsel had not completed an assessment of the Criminal Rule 4[(C)] issue. … Only on June 22, 2017 did Defense Counsel complete his calculations and determine that a Criminal Rule 4[(C)] issue existed.
A hearing was held on the motion, and the State argued that Myers had acquiesced to the November 2017 trial date by not objecting when that date was set at the pretrial conference. Myers’s attorney disagreed and reiterated that, as of May 26, he “didn’t know that there was a CR 4 issue.” . . . The trial court agreed that the motion was “early enough,” and ordered Myers discharged.
….
Here, it is undisputed that Myers did not object during the one-year period. The State had 20 days remaining in the one-year period when the pretrial conference was held on May 26. At that conference, the trial court asked either party if there was any Rule 4(C) issue, but neither party expressed any concern. Trial was then set for November 2017. Myers did not object. …
Nevertheless, Myers contends that his motion was timely because he filed it “the same day he made the calculation of the time period remaining under Rule 4(C).” Myers cites Havvard v. State, presumably for the following proposition: “When a defendant learns within the period provided by the rule that the case is set for trial at a time beyond the date permitted, the defendant must object to such a trial setting at the earliest opportunity.” 703 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). Myers renews his argument and takes the position that this passage allows a defendant to object to a trial date when he “learns” that the date is outside of the one-year period, regardless of when he “learns” that fact. The first problem with his contention is that Havvard also states that “[a]n objection must be lodged in time to permit the trial court to reset the trial for a date within the proper period.” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there is no question that Myers did not alert the trial court in time to permit it to reset the trial for a date within the one-year period.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the use of the word “learns” in Havvard was meant as an invitation for a defendant to calculate the Rule 4(C) deadline at his convenience, as Myers contends. This would eliminate the defendant’s burden to object during the one-year period to a trial date that is set beyond the deadline. … At the very least, Myers’s attorney should have calculated the deadline reasonably soon after the pretrial conference—at which the trial court specifically inquired about Rule 4(C)—and objected with time still remaining in the one-year period. … Because Myers failed to object to the November 2017 trial date before the one-year period expired, he acquiesced to the trial date and waived any claim to discharge under Rule 4(C). …
Of course, this does not mean that the State is now free to try Myers whenever it pleases. As of May 26, the State had 20 days left on its one-year period under Rule 4(C). Therefore, within 7 days of this opinion being certified, the trial court shall hold a hearing and, if Myers demands it, set a trial within 20 days of the hearing. If court congestion prevents the court from setting a date within that timeframe, the court should make an explicit finding to that effect and set the trial for the next available date.
Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Altice, J., concur.