Robb, J.
Scott Randall brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a police officer’s observations while conducting a welfare check. The trial court concluded the welfare check was supported by the community caretaking function. …
Around 9:00 p.m. on July 29, 2016, Deputy Ashley Rose, a special deputy of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office performing off-duty security work for St. Vincent’s Hospital, was patrolling the same-day surgery parking lot when he observed a man sitting in the driver’s seat of a black Ford Focus with the driver’s door open and ignition off. The man, later identified as Randall, “appeared to be leaning forward over the steering wheel” or “slumped over.”
Deputy Rose decided to conduct a “welfare check” and proceeded to pull behind Randall’s car while activating his “overhead takedown lights.” … Deputy Rose then approached Randall’s car and began speaking with him while the driver’s door was still open. During this time, Deputy Rose observed that Randall was speaking quickly, “sweating very intensely,” and that he began “reaching around the car very nervously.” Deputy Rose also observed a “folded square of aluminum foil” on the dashboard of the car, which he believed to be consistent with narcotic use.
Suspecting drugs were in the car, Deputy Rose attempted to “find out what else would be in the vehicle that would be paraphernalia or narcotics related.” Specifically, Deputy Rose told Randall that he “had experience and I asked him what else in the vehicle he would not want a canine officer to find.”
Randall admitted that he had a marijuana pipe, and Deputy Rose then instructed him to exit his vehicle. … Randall was detained, placed in handcuffs, and seated nearby while a search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine and two marijuana pipes. Because Deputy Rose had no further questions to ask Randall once he was in custody, he “did not feel Miranda was required” and therefore, Randall “was not read Miranda that night.”
Randall was subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and two counts of possession of paraphernalia, both Class C misdemeanors. Randall moved to suppress the evidence against him and the trial court denied his motion after a hearing …
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… The trial court found the seizure reasonable pursuant to the community caretaking function and Randall now argues its application was erroneous. Although we agree that the community caretaking function was inapplicable on the facts presented, we nevertheless find Randall’s seizure permissible under the emergency aid doctrine.
Put simply, the community caretaking function is:
a catchall term for the wide range of responsibilities that police officers must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement activities. Indeed, besides enforcing criminal laws, police aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards . . . and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community safety.
Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, the trial court relied primarily on our decision in McNeal v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), vacated in relevant part by McNeal v. State, 76 N.E.3d 136 (Ind. 2017). There, a panel of this court adopted a three-prong analysis “for evaluating claims of police community caretaking functions as set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Kramer, 315 Wis.3d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, 605 (2009).” McNeal, 62 N.E.3d at 1281. The trial court applied the Kramer three prong analysis before concluding Deputy Rose’s actions were justified by the community caretaking function. Just a few weeks after the trial court’s order, however, our supreme court issued its opinion in McNeal v. State, which expressly vacated the Kramer analysis:
[McNeal] asks this Court to vacate a portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
McNeal’s request is well-taken. We now grant transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the community caretaking function . . . .
76 N.E.3d at 137.
Because our supreme court expressly vacated the Kramer analysis, Randall alleges the trial court’s legal basis for denying his motion to suppress “cannot be upheld.” We agree, and to the extent the trial court applied the community caretaking function, such application was erroneous.
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Although the trial court erroneously applied the community caretaking function, its reasoning tracked another exception to the warrant requirement with a basis in the record—the emergency aid doctrine. The emergency aid doctrine is premised on the theory that police should be able to act without obtaining a warrant when they reasonably believe a person needs immediate aid or attention. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Under the emergency aid doctrine, an officer may act without a warrant where the officer had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (quotations omitted).
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Returning to the facts presented here, while patrolling a hospital parking lot where he testified that people have died, Deputy Rose observed a man appearing to be “slumped over” the steering wheel of his car with his driver’s door open. We believe these observations “could give rise to a reasonable concern that emergency medical assistance was needed, prompting further investigation . . . .” M.O., 63 N.E.3d at 333. Therefore, we conclude that Deputy Rose had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Randall required medical assistance when he initially observed his vehicle.
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Despite the trial court erroneously applying the community caretaking function, its ruling was sustainable on the emergency aid exception. We therefore conclude that Randall’s seizure was reasonable and his statements were not made in violation of Miranda. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Randall’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.