Baker, J.
J.R.C. (Putative Father) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition to establish paternity of K.A.W. (Child) and granting the petition to adopt Child that had been filed by J.C. and D.C. (Adoptive Parents). Putative Father argues that the trial court erred by finding that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied and by granting the adoption petition without a statutorily required affidavit. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
….
Putative Father first argues that the trial court erred by finding that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied because he failed to register as a putative father in a timely fashion. Indiana Code section 31-19-5-18 provides as follows: “[a] putative father who fails to register within the period specified by section 12 of this chapter waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied consent to the child’s adoption.” [Footnote omitted.]
To comply with Indiana Code section 31-19-5-12, Putative Father was required to register within thirty days of Child’s birth or by the date on which Adoptive Parents filed their petition to adopt Child. I.C. § 31-19-5-12(a). [Footnote omitted.] It is undisputed that Putative Father did not meet either of these deadlines. Instead, he did not register as a putative father until Child was over three years old and the adoption petition had been pending for eighteen months. As such, the trial court did not err by finding that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied.
Putative Father makes a compelling argument that the purpose of the Putative Father Registry is to ensure that putative fathers have notice if someone is seeking to adopt their child(ren). I.C. § 31-19-5-3. In this case, Putative Father not only had notice, he was an active participant; first, he took the initiative to file a pro se paternity action and then, he actively took part in the adoption proceedings. Here, therefore, there was no true reason that he had to register. Indeed, it feels as though this outcome is not only nonsensical, but unjust; it feels as though his action of filing the paternity cause should have been enough to preserve his right to object; it feels as though this is the ultimate “gotcha” outcome. In a perfect world, we would reverse. But this world is not perfect, and the statute says what it says, which is that the failure to register in a timely fashion leads to irrevocably implied consent. [Footnote omitted.] We are compelled to affirm the trial court given the plain language of the statute at issue.
….
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., concurs. Bradford, J., concurs in result without an opinion.