Goff, J.
Indiana’s Special Probation Conditions for Adult Sex Offenders impose significant restrictions on probationers’ conduct, including their internet access and use. … Here, Kristopher Weida challenges the propriety of two special sex offender probation conditions, arguing that they are both unreasonable and unconstitutional. …
On March 28, 2015, thirty-four-year-old Kristopher Weida had sexual intercourse with his sixteen-year-old niece, K.M. … The State accordingly charged Weida with Level 5 felony incest (Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3) and he pleaded guilty without an agreement on sentencing terms.
Following a sentencing hearing in which Weida and the State each presented evidence and argument, the trial court sentenced Weida to three years—one year executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. The court imposed probation conditions, including Indiana’s Special Probation Conditions for Adult Sex Offenders. Some conditions limited Weida’s internet use.
Specifically, Condition 8 provided:
You are prohibited from accessing or using certain web sites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by children. You are prohibited from deleting, erasing, or tampering with information on your personal computer with intent to conceal an activity prohibited by this condition. *Required as a condition of probation by IC 35-38-2-2.2(4).
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Condition 26 imposed a broader internet prohibition. It read:
You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service through use of a computer, cell phone, iPod, Xbox, Blackberry, personal digital assistant (PDA), pagers, Palm Pilots, televisions, or any other electronic device at any location (including your place of employment) without prior approval of your probation officer. This includes any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, e-mail system or any other public or private computer network. You shall not possess or use any data encryption technique or program.
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… Weida calls on us to decide when probation conditions limiting internet access become unreasonable or unduly intrusive upon a probationer’s constitutional right to free speech.
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Considering Condition 8’s prohibition on “accessing or using certain web sites . . . frequented by children” in the big picture, we understand the term to prohibit using websites that allow Weida to contact or communicate with children. Indeed, a handful of Weida’s probation conditions work together to limit his contact or communication with children through any means, internet included.
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Other probation conditions prohibit Weida from contacting or communicating with children through any medium.
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… The trial court instructed Weida regarding the conditions restricting his internet use. The court told Weida he could use the internet for the purpose of contacting and communicating with his own children.
… Because Condition 8 provides sufficient clarity and particularity to give a person with ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is generally proscribed, we hold the condition is not unconstitutionally vague.
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Likewise, we find that Condition 8 does not unduly intrude on Weida’s First Amendment rights. …
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Weida levels the same multilayered attack against Condition 26—that it creates a blanket internet ban that is both unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to him. … Condition 26 provides in pertinent part:
You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service . . . without prior approval of your probation officer.
To begin, we note that we do not anticipate receiving future challenges to Condition 26 like Weida’s present challenge. Since Weida’s sentencing and our hearing this case, the standard Condition 26 underwent significant changes. It no longer imposes an expansive internet ban. The new Condition 26 now provides:
You are prohibited from accessing, viewing, or using internet websites and computer applications that depict obscene matter as defined by IC 35-49-2-1 or child pornography as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). You shall not possess or use any data encryption technique or program to conceal your internet activity.
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Weida labels the old Condition 26 a “blanket Internet ban” that “requires [him] to contact his probation officer every time he wishes to access the Internet.” … There is no blanket ban on all internet access for Weida here because in the sentencing hearing the trial court expressly granted him permission to access the internet at any time for the purposes of communicating with his children. …What’s more, we don’t read Condition 26 to demand that Weida receive prior approval every time he accesses the internet. “Prior approval” does not translate to “single-instance-approval.” …
Although we disagree with Weida’s characterization of the old Condition 26, we agree its restriction on internet access in his case reaches beyond reasonableness into unreasonableness. In other words, Condition 26’s prior broad prohibition on internet access but for the court’s or the probation officer’s permission, is not reasonably related to Weida’s rehabilitation or maintaining public safety. …
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…A more appropriate internet restriction—one that reasonably relates to his rehabilitation and protecting the public—will restrict his access to obscene or sexually explicit material. Such a restriction will assist him in rehabilitating and avoiding enticement to re-offend yet allow him to remain a productive member of our internet-dependent society. He can still look for jobs, attend classes online, pay bills, read news, and otherwise lead a rehabilitated life. We finally note that a narrower internet restriction does not sacrifice public safety since Weida will still be prohibited from accessing material that related to his offense.
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Because probation conditions restricting a probationer’s internet access prohibit what would otherwise be lawful conduct, they cannot be vague; they must reasonably relate to the probationer’s rehabilitation and public safety; and they cannot unduly intrude upon constitutional rights. … We now hold that Condition 8 is not vague, unreasonable, or unduly intrusive on Weida’s constitutional rights. But Condition 26, as previously written and applied to Weida, is unreasonable since it does not reasonably relate to his rehabilitation and protecting the public. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.