May, J.
Carl T. Wilson brings an interlocutory appeal of the pretrial denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Wilson argues the evidence should have been suppressed because the search occurred after police officers arrested him without probable cause. We reverse.
On September 6, 2016, a resident of a duplex made a 911 call complaining of a car parked in the yard on the unoccupied side of the duplex. …
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Joshua Stayton and Jeremy Miller responded to the 911 call. … Shining a spotlight into the car, Officer Stayton saw two people inside the vehicle. Officer Miller arrived soon thereafter.
As the officers approached the car, Officer Stayton recognized the passenger as someone with a history of “prostitution and drug use.” A man, later identified as Wilson, exited the car but immediately bent back into it and reached toward the center console. Because of his knowledge of crime in the area and Wilson’s movements inside the vehicle, Officer Stayton drew his weapon and ordered Wilson to show his hands. … The officers patted Wilson down and handcuffed him “for [officer] safety.”
After handcuffing Wilson, the officers asked Wilson “[a]t least twice” if they could search the vehicle and he said they could. The officers took Wilson “maybe twenty feet” away from the car after he was handcuffed. The officers did not give Wilson Pirtle or Miranda advisements. The officers also removed Wilson’s passenger from the car and handcuffed her. Then they took turns searching the vehicle. … After popping open a loose part of the center console, Officer Miller found “a bag of something” which he believed to be drugs. Officer Stayton retrieved the bag and found it contained heroin and methamphetamine.
The State charged Wilson with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. … Wilson filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the drugs retrieved during the search. … After a hearing and subsequent briefing … the trial court denied Wilson’s motion without findings of fact or conclusions of law.
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a warrant supported by probable cause. To deter State actors from violating that prohibition, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment generally is not admissible in a prosecution of the citizen whose right was violated. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). …
An officer may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if the officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest. Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). … An officer conducting an investigatory stop may “take reasonable steps to ensure his own safety.” Id. at 46. However, an investigatory stop may be converted to an arrest depending on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
An “arrest” is “the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime.” Ind. Code § 35-33-1-5. Our Indiana Supreme Court has said: “An arrest occurs when a police officer interrupts the freedom of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement.” Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. 1996). …
In Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, we reviewed the facts of two cases in which the use of handcuffs constituted an arrest and two cases in which the use of handcuffs occurred during an investigatory stop, see id. at 1204-05, and held the determination whether a citizen was arrested or subject to a Terry stop depended on the totality of the circumstances in each case. …
In Reinhart, we reviewed the totality of circumstances when the officer ordered Reinhart from his car at gunpoint. Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 47. Reinhart calmly complied with all orders given. Id. With the laser sight of the officer’s gun fixed on him, Reinhart was ordered to kneel and then lay down on the ground, which he did. Id. Reinhart had given no indication he was armed or dangerous. Id. We held a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave; thus, the officer’s actions constituted an arrest. Id. at 48.
The situation here is more analogous to Reinhart. …
… What may have begun as an investigatory stop quickly transformed into an arrest. Wilson complied with all of the officers’ orders. The officers approached Wilson at gunpoint and then handcuffed him. Wilson remained handcuffed and guarded by one or the other officer while two searches of his vehicle were conducted. A reasonable person would not believe himself free to leave. See Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 47 …
… The officers’ actions exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop and became an arrest without probable cause. As the arrest was without probable cause, the admission of evidence obtained from the search was in error. See Sanchez, 803 N.E.2d at 221 (“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine bars illegally obtained evidence from admission).
We conclude Wilson was under arrest for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis because the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Wilson, which restrained his freedom of movement. Therefore, because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Wilson prior to their search of his vehicle and seizure of the drugs, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Wilson’s motion to suppress evidence.
Reversed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.