Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
S.B. appeals the trial court’s issuance of an order for protection on behalf of Seymour Community Schools (“SCS”).1 S.B. raises four issues for our review, which we restate as the following three issues:
1. Whether SCS has standing to petition for an order for protection.
2. Whether the trial court’s issuance of the order for protection was clearly erroneous.
3. Whether the order for protection violates S.B.’s rights under the First Amendment or the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We affirm and remand with instructions.
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On the merits, S.B. asserts that SCS lacks standing to petition for an order for protection because the Act states that such petitions must be filed by “[a] person” or by “[a] parent, a guardian, or another representative . . . on behalf of a child.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(a), (b) (2017). The Act further states that such a petition must be filed against either a “family or household member who commits an act of domestic or family violence” or against a “person who has committed stalking . . . or a sex offense” against the petitioner or the child. I.C. § 34-26-5-2(a), (b). And the Act provides that its provisions “shall be construed to promote the: (1) protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; and (2) prevention of future domestic and family violence.” I.C. § 34-26-5-1. According to S.B., that language demonstrates a clear legislative intent to limit who may petition for an order for protection to a “biological person.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. We reject S.B.’s argument for three reasons.
First, the Act expressly provides that “another representative” may petition for an order for protection on behalf of a child. I.C. § 34-26-5-2(b)… Accordingly, we conclude that one who stands in loco parentis to a child is “another representative” who may petition for an order for protection on behalf of that child under Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2.
SCS stands in loco parentis to the children within its schools while they are there. Indeed, its petition expressly declared that it sought the order for protection on behalf of its students. As such, SCS had standing to petition for the order for protection of behalf of those children.
Second, “person” is not specially defined within the Act. Accordingly, we look to Indiana Code Chapter 1-1-4, which provides generally applicable statutory definitions. In particular, Indiana Code Section 1-1-4-5(a)(17) states that “‘[p]erson’ extends to bodies politic and corporate.” Thus, under the generally applicable statutory definition of “person,” the Act applies to SCS…
Third, extending “person” under the Act to SCS is not “plainly repugnant to the intent of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.” I.C. § 1-1-4-5(a)…
We conclude that that definition is in pari materia with the Act. See, e.g., Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 989 (Ind. 2016). While an order for protection is a civil order, such orders are surrounded by criminal provisions…Thus, the Act is intertwined with our criminal statutes, and we will interpret them harmoniously.
Moreover, our conclusion is precisely within our legislature’s intent. Our legislature has recognized that school safety is a priority. For example, Indiana Code Section 20-19-3-14 establishes a Division of School Building Physical Security and Safety as part of the Indiana Department of Education. Indiana Code Section 5-2-10.1-9 requires each school corporation to designate a school safety specialist, whose responsibilities include the development and coordination of safety plans. And Indiana Code Section 35-47-9-2(a) generally provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm on school property commits a Level 6 felony.
As the recent tragic events in Parkland, Florida, have reminded us, some persons who might present a threat to a school have had a relationship with the school that school officials are in a unique position to identify. This would most often include students or former students who have a disciplinary history or have exhibited significant behavioral issues. We conclude that school corporations, through their officials, are permitted to act on behalf of their students to seek orders for protection against such threats. Accordingly, we reject S.B.’s argument that SCS lacked standing to petition for an order for protection.
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Conclusion
In sum, we hold that a school corporation has standing to petition for an order for protection on behalf of its students. We further hold that the trial court’s issuance of the order for protection on these facts is not clearly erroneous, and, thus, we affirm the order for protection. Although we affirm the court’s order, we remand with instructions for the court to modify the order for protection as explained above.
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.