Riley, J.
Appellant-Respondent, D.Z., appeals the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication for an act that would have been a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
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Around February or March 2017, graffiti of a sexual nature began to appear on the walls of the boys’ restrooms at Brownsburg High School, in Indiana. Assistant principal Demetrius Dowler (Dowler) commenced an investigation to find the person responsible and reviewed surveillance video footage of the hallways where the related bathrooms are located. On March 15, 2017, Dowler reported “mischief of vandalism and graffiti” on the bathroom walls and stalls to Officer Nathan Flynn (Officer Flynn) and requested his assistance with the ongoing investigation. … After reviewing the surveillance video, both Officer Flynn and Dowler pinpointed seventeen-year-old D.Z. as a suspect.
On March 17, 2017, Dowler called D.Z. down to his office for a “discussion” right before the “[e]nd of the day.” Dowler questioned D.Z. in his office with the door closed. D.Z. was not offered the opportunity to speak to a parent or guardian prior to the commencement of the interview, nor was his parent or guardian contacted prior to D.Z.’s removal from class. During this conversation, D.Z. was not advised that “he had a right not to answer questions that might incriminate himself.” Dowler informed D.Z. that he had been “tracking some restroom graffiti” and explained the investigation to him. Dowler clarified that he “knew that [D.Z.] was the one that was responsible for graffiti on the wall.” D.Z. responded that he didn’t know why he did it. … Dowler suspended D.Z. for five days. After his discussion with D.Z., Dowler left the room and informed Officer Flynn that D.Z. had “admitted to the messages/writing on the wall.” … Meanwhile, Officer Flynn, in full police uniform, entered Dowler’s office and spoke to D.Z. The officer did not advise D.Z. of his constitutional rights, contact D.Z.’s father, or record the interview. Eventually, at the end of the interview, Officer Flynn “let [D.Z.] know he was being charged with a crime.”
… On July 17, 2017, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing. … At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding on the allegation of criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult, but found that the State had not established the harassment allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. That same day, the juvenile court placed D.Z. on probation for four months.
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… in cases where a juvenile is subject to custodial interrogation, such child must be read his rights under Miranda and the State must obtain the waiver of such rights pursuant to the juvenile waiver statute. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1. As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and subject to interrogation. See S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 430. Therefore, the threshold question becomes whether D.Z. was in custody, and if so, whether the questioning by the assistant principal constituted interrogation as recognized under the federal and state constitutions.
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… In recent years, the presence of police in schools has changed more than just the frequency and nature of interactions between students and police and many schools have instituted ‘zero tolerance’ for school behavior. See N.C. v. Com., 396 S.W. 3d 852, 863 (Ky. 2013). … In light of this changing educational landscape, school administrators have altered their activities to collaborate more actively with police officers. Id. …
… Police officers are not divested of their law enforcement authority when they enter schools; schools employ them precisely because they wield this authority. As such, the presence of law enforcement in schools on a daily basis serves notice that crimes will be charged for conduct the officer believes violates the law. N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 864. This is not inappropriate, but it does change the nature of questioning a child for school discipline purposes to an improper police interrogation absent constitutional safeguards. …
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Turning to the facts before us, we conclude that D.Z. was submitted to a custodial interrogation at which he should have been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda. …
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Although on its face appearing to be a school disciplinary proceeding, the ‘discussion’ between Dowler and D.Z. amounted in essence to an interrogation, geared towards a criminal proceeding. …
Police officers cannot avoid their duty under Miranda by attempting to have someone act as their agent in order to bypass the Miranda requirements. … Because the assistant principal and Officer Flynn acted in concert in obtaining these incriminating statements, and both were aware of the probability of criminal charges, D.Z. should have been advised of his Miranda rights. … We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of delinquency.
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Reversed.
Baker, J. concurs with separate concurring opinion
Brown, J. dissents with separate opinion
Baker, Judge, concurring.
… I write separately to acknowledge the State’s compelling argument that when D.Z. sat down with Dowler, it was merely a school disciplinary meeting that in no way implicated D.Z.’s Miranda rights. … The frequent—in some places, constant—presence of officers in our schools has, in my view, changed the nature of the school disciplinary process. … Under these circumstances, and given the general evolution of the school disciplinary process into something quasi- (or actually) criminal in nature, I fully concur with the majority’s determination that the finding of delinquency should be reversed.
Brown, Judge, dissenting.
… Viewed from a schoolhouse perspective, D.Z.’s actions interfered with the maintenance of an orderly and effective educational system, Dowler’s February and March investigation was an attempt to identify the cause of the interference, and his discussion with D.Z. was an attempt to restore order. …
Officer Flynn testified that he did not direct Dowler in any questioning, that when Dowler decided to bring in D.Z. for questioning, he was not in the office at the time of questioning, that he had a conversation with D.Z. after Dowler’s conversation, and that he entered
Dowler’s office only after Dowler had exited, spoke to D.Z., and eventually let D.Z. know he was being charged.
While it may be true that schools are different than they used to be, I would hold on these facts as this Court did in C.D., 947 N.E.2d at 1022-1023; S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 679-680; and G.J. v. State, 716 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and find that no Miranda violation occurred in the statements made to Dowler outside the presence of Officer Flynn and affirm the trial court’s finding.