Goff, J.
Protective orders have sweeping reach in our state. … Because violating a protective order amounts to a criminal act, the State must prove a mens rea element—that the person intended to violate the order. …
In 2008, a parishioner in a small Solsberry, Indiana church leveled accusations against the pastor, K.G. … Despite efforts from church leaders to remedy the situation and bring reconciliation, the relationship between Phipps and K.G. deteriorated. Phipps left the church and began writing to K.G. and other parishioners about her departure.
Later that year, citing repeated “harassment and emails and letters” from Phipps, K.G. sought a protective order. The court issued a protective order that included standard statutory relief, prohibiting Phipps from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” K.G. …
In 2009, Phipps violated the order by speaking to K.G. In April of that year, she pleaded guilty to Invasion of Privacy as a Class A misdemeanor for this violation. In that case, the trial court sentenced Phipps to 180 days incarceration with 176 days suspended to probation. In 2010, Phipps violated the protective order a second time. She pleaded guilty in March 2011 and was ordered to serve one year in the Greene County Jail with all but sixteen days suspended.
In January 2016, K.G. filed a petition to extend the original order of protection. The Greene County Superior Court granted the petition and extended the order for another two years. On February 28, 2016, Phipps emailed three elders at the church. …
Upon learning of the email from a church elder, K.G. requested that the elder forward him the message. K.G. then contacted the police. On March 3, 2016 the State charged Phipps with two counts of Invasion of Privacy: one as a Class A misdemeanor and the second as a Level 6 felony. … A jury found Phipps guilty as charged. The trial court merged the two verdicts and entered a judgment of conviction for the Level 6 felony. It sentenced Phipps to two-and-one-half years with one year in work release and the remaining one-and-one-half years suspended to probation.
Phipps appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. She also argued the trial court abused its discretion by considering her criminal history as an aggravating circumstance and that her two-and-one-half-year sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals majority concluded that “Phipps’s email is a request to the church elders to take action for the alleged wrongful conduct of their employee, K.G. [and] [u]pon receipt of Phipps’s email, the church elders had discretion to ignore her email or respond to her demands.” Phipps v. State, 77 N.E.3d 180, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The majority reasoned that “Phipps did not ask the elders to share her email with K.G., and a church elder made an independent decision to forward the email to K.G.” Id. Therefore, the majority “conclude[d] that Phipps’s intent in sending the email was not to contact K.G., but to ask the church elders to discipline or punish K.G. for his alleged wrongful conduct.” Id. …
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To convict Phipps of invasion of privacy as a Level 6 felony, the State had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that she (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) violated an ex parte protective order [by harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with K.G.]; and (3) has a prior, unrelated conviction for invasion of privacy. I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(2) (2014 Repl.). At oral argument, the parties agreed this case narrowly turns on the first element—intent. We, therefore, limit our review to that specific issue. The State maintains it met its burden whereas Phipps argues otherwise. Based on the evidence presented to the jury, we agree with the State.
We must begin our analysis by acknowledging that “intentionally” and “knowingly” are statutorily defined terms. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, it is [her] conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a) (2014 Repl.). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, [s]he is aware of a high probability that [s]he is doing so.” Id. at § 35-41-2-2(b) (2014 Repl.). … Therefore, it is well-established that a defendant’s intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence. McCaskill v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1047,1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). …
While there is no direct proof of Phipps’ conscious objective here, there is ample circumstantial evidence that shows she knew she would be communicating indirectly with K.G. by emailing the church elders. …
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Phipps claims the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence based on her criminal history because her prior conviction was a necessary element of the invasion of privacy charge here. …
… Although Phipps’s criminal history is limited to the two prior convictions for invasion of privacy, we see from the sentencing-hearing transcript that the trial court did not find her convictions to be an aggravating circumstance. Rather, the trial court concluded that Phipps’s behavior of harassing K.G., which “has gone over for over 7 years,” was an aggravator. Our jurisprudence provides that Phipps’s convictions cannot be used to enhance her sentence, but the particular facts—the ongoing nature and length of her criminal conduct—can properly be considered as aggravation. See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 561 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ind. 1990) … Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution, implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), gives this Court power to review and revise all criminal sentences. …The defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court that her sentence is inappropriate. Id.
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Considering the nature of this offense, we note Phipps deliberately defied the protective order in place since 2009. What’s more, this conviction constitutes her third violation of that order. …
… Since we are not convinced that Phipps’s sentence proves inappropriate considering her offense and character, we will not revise it.
For the reasons discussed, we affirm Phipps’s conviction and her sentence.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, J.J., concur.