Bradford, J.
On June 15, 2016, Appellee-Defendant Latasha Bonds was charged with two misdemeanor offenses. Bonds waived her right to a trial by jury, instead electing to be tried in a bench trial. Appellant-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”), however, filed a written demand for a jury trial. The State initiated this interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied its demand for a jury trial and set the matter for a bench trial. …
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… In raising this contention, the State claims that the trial court erred in interpreting Indiana Code section 35-37-1-2 and Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (“Criminal Rule 22”). …
“The jury trial right is a bedrock of our criminal justice system, guaranteed by both Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution [(“Article I, Section 13”)] and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution [(“the Sixth Amendment”)].” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2016) (bracketed material added). …
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Criminal Rule 22 provides as follows:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand trial by jury by filing a written demand therefor not later than ten (10) days before his first scheduled trial date. The failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as required by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury unless the defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days advance notice of his scheduled trial date and of the consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.
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… Criminal Rule 22 sets forth the procedure that an accused must follow if he or she wishes to submit his or her case to a jury rather than the trial court. Criminal Rule 22, however, makes no mention of any procedure by which the State may request to have the case be tried before a jury. If the Indiana Supreme Court had intended for the right to trial by jury to be extended to the State, it easily could have indicated that the procedures set forth in Criminal Rule 22 applied in equal force to both the accused and the State.
For many years, Indiana Code section 35-37-1-2 provided that “[t]he defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to the court. All other trials must be by jury.” The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted this statute as meaning that “all criminal trials must be by jury except where [a bench trial is] consented to by both the parties and the court[.]” Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 263, 156 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1959). However, effective July 1, 2015, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-37-1-2 to provide that “[t]he defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to the court. Unless a defendant waives the right to a jury trial under the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, all other trials must be by jury.” …
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Considering the language of Criminal Rule 22 coupled with the recent change to Indiana Code section 35-37-1-2 and the Indiana Supreme Court’s statement found in footnote 1 in Horton, we infer that the General Assembly and the Indiana Supreme Court intended for misdemeanors to continue to be treated differently than felonies with regard to waiver of one’s right to trial by jury. We further conclude that because the instant matter involves only a misdemeanor charge, Criminal Rule 22, which does not require the State’s consent to a defendant’s waiver of her right to a jury trial, controls.
… Because we conclude that the State did not have the right to demand a jury trial and that the State’s consent to a bench trial was not necessary, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. On remand, the matter should therefore proceed to a bench trial.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.