Baker, J.
Major Wilson appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously determined that he received effective assistance of appellate counsel. …
On March 6, 2014, the State charged Wilson with ten counts of various crimes. On March 12, 2014, a public defender entered an appearance on Wilson’s behalf. On July 10, 2014, Wilson filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to dismiss his public defender. A pre-trial hearing took place on July 30, 2014 …
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Following discussion, the trial court told Wilson, “You may represent yourself.” The trial court then asked Wilson whether he would like to have standby counsel. Wilson agreed, stating, “I’ll go by the Court’s decision, go ahead let him [act] as standby.”
A jury trial took place on August 20, 2014; the jury found Wilson guilty as charged. … On November 5, 2014, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 100 years.
On direct appeal, Wilson’s appellate counsel argued only that the State presented insufficient evidence to support Wilson’s conviction for Class B felony burglary. We affirmed in a memorandum decision. Wilson v. State, No. 45A03-1412-CR-425, 2015 WL 4740412, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015).
On August 18, 2016, Wilson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On January 9, 2017, he filed, by counsel, an amended petition for postconviction relief. An evidentiary hearing took place on March 9, 2017. Appellate counsel testified that she did not request transcripts from Wilson’s pre-trial hearings in which his waiver of his right to counsel was discussed; she also testified that she thought she should have requested them.
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On June 15, 2017, the post-conviction court denied Wilson’s petition …
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Wilson argues that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his appellate counsel failed to review the complete record of his trial proceedings and, as a result, failed to argue that Wilson’s waiver of counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
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Before reaching the substance of this appeal, we are compelled to address the trial court’s lack of knowledge of basic constitutional law. During Wilson’s pretrial hearings, the trial court repeatedly told Wilson that he did not have a right to represent himself; stated that the trial court had decided that he could not represent himself; and asked Wilson where he heard or read about the right to represent himself. … This egregious lack of knowledge presents a serious risk to the rights of defendants and demands that we direct the trial court to case law regarding a criminal defendant’s fundamental rights. We advise the trial court to review this case law in depth and without delay.
… Before a defendant waives his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. E.g., Jones, 783 N.E.2d at 1138. “When a defendant asserts the right to self representation, the court should tell the defendant of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’”
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The post-conviction court stated that appellate counsel need not “look beyond the trial record for issues on appeal, and it is incumbent upon the trial counsel to inform appellate counsel of any issues not preserved in the record.” …
The inherent problem with the post-conviction court’s analysis is that it assumes that the record from the actual trial is the only record an appellate attorney need review, and a transcript from another hearing would be outside the record. But a record on appeal includes “all proceedings before the trial court.” Ind. Appellate Rule 2(L) (emphasis added). …
… The transcripts from the pre-trial hearings contained the only evidence to support a claim that Wilson did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel. She did not raise the issue because she was not aware of it. …
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The trial court’s failure to ensure that Wilson’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent was evident from a plain reading of the transcripts from the pre-trial hearings. …
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… Failure to review the transcripts and raise this issue on appeal falls below prevailing professional norms …
… Wilson argues that had appellate counsel raised the issue that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, his conviction likely would have been reversed. We agree.
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In sum, there was a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s error, the result of Wilson’s appeal would have been different. …
Appellate counsel’s failure to review the pre-trial hearing transcripts and present an argument about Wilson’s waiver of his right to counsel on direct appeal amounted to ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court’s finding to the contrary leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.