Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Kailei L. Poteet (Mother), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition to establish paternity of her minor child.
We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
Mother raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Mother’s petition to establish paternity.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 21, 2012, Mother gave birth to I.I.P. (the Child). Near the time of the Child’s conception, Mother was in a relationship with Appellee-Intervening Respondent, Nathan T. Poteet (Legal Father). Around that same time, Mother also had an intimate relationship with Appellee-Respondent, Justin A. Rodgers (Biological Father), and ended her relationship with Legal Father. When the Child was approximately four months old, Mother and Legal Father resumed their relationship and eventually began cohabiting. On September 13, 2014, they married. Legal Father established a bond with the Child and provided care for her. On January 13, 2015, Legal Father executed a paternity affidavit to establish his paternity of the two-year-old Child. Mother also signed the paternity affidavit identifying Legal Father as the Child’s father. During the parties’ marriage, Mother gave birth to another child. Shortly after their first anniversary, on November 30, 2015, Legal Father filed a petition in the Pike County Circuit Court to dissolve his marriage to Mother.
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The resolution of this matter hinges on an interpretation of Indiana’s paternity statutes…..
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In this case, there is no dispute that Legal Father established paternity by executing a paternity affidavit. More than sixty days have lapsed since Legal Father executed the paternity affidavit on January 13, 2015. Furthermore, Legal Father never requested a genetic test; rather, Mother sought the DNA testing that excluded Legal Father as the biological parent. Moreover, the trial court determined during the dissolution proceedings that there was no fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact in the execution of the paternity affidavit. Thus, it appears that there is no statutory basis for rescinding the paternity affidavit. [Footnote omitted.]
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Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-14-4-1, a paternity action may be filed by, in relevant part, the mother; a man alleging to be the child’s biological father; the mother and alleged father, jointly; or the child. Yet, there are certain statutory limitations for filing a paternity action….
Mother now contends that the paternity petition was timely filed because she filed it as the Child’s next friend, and even though the petition did not explicitly contain those words, the trial court should have recognized it as such or granted her leave to amend the petition accordingly. Biological Father additionally argues that the trial court disregarded the four applicable exceptions that permitted either him or Mother to file the paternity action more than two years after the Child’s birth. First, Biological Father asserts that even though he and Mother did not technically file a joint petition to establish his paternity to the Child, “it was made abundantly clear through both the [divorce and paternity] proceedings that [Biological Father] and [Mother] are of the same position, namely that [Biological Father] should be adjudicated the father of [the Child].” (Biological Father’s Br. p. 8). Similar to Mother, Biological Father contends that he and Mother should have been afforded an opportunity to file an amended joint petition. Second, Biological Father further argues that evidence was presented to the trial court establishing that he furnished support for the Child. Third, Biological Father contends that it is a mere technicality that could be fixed with an amended pleading that he did not acknowledge his status as biological father in writing prior to Mother filing the paternity petition. Fourth, now that Mother has acknowledged in writing that he is the biological father, Biological Father points out that he could file a paternity petition without violating the statute of limitations. [Footnote omitted.]
While we feel compelled to express our exasperation over the instability and confusion that the irregularity of these proceedings has undoubtedly caused the now five-year-old Child—who developed a bond with Legal Father only to be subsequently introduced to a new father figure and inevitably distanced from Legal Father—we nevertheless agree with Mother and Biological Father that Legal Father is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mother’s petition to establish paternity. Biological Father and Mother could have effectively disestablished Legal Father’s paternity/established Biological Father’s paternity if Mother’s paternity petition had strictly complied with Indiana Code section 31-14-5-2(a)-(b) or Indiana Code section 31-14-5-3(b)(1), (3), or (4). The trial court ignored Mother’s request to amend her paternity petition. Regardless, at the very least, there is a material question of fact as to whether Biological Father provided support for the Child. Biological Father testified that he had been living with Mother and the Child for eight months preceding the paternity hearing, during which time he provided financial support for the Child’s care. The provision of support would permit Biological Father or Mother to file a paternity petition more than two years after the Child’s birth, thereby establishing paternity in Biological Father and disestablishing the same in Legal Father. See I.C. § 31-14-5-3(b)(2),(c); Drake, 717 N.E.2d at 1232 (precluding summary judgment where genuine issue of material fact as to whether biological father contributed to the child’s support). We find that further proceedings are warranted in this case. [Footnote omitted.]
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Legal Father was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mother’s petition to establish paternity.
Reversed and remanded.
Brown, J. concurs
Baker, J. dissents with separate opinion
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The plain language of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1(l) provides that where, as here, a paternity affidavit has already been executed pursuant to that section, it may not be rescinded unless the trial court:
(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit; and
(2) at the request of a man described in subsection (k), has ordered a genetic test, and the test indicates that the man is excluded as the father of the child.
Neither of those circumstances has occurred in this case.
The majority cites Indiana Code section 31-14-5-3 as support for its conclusion. In my view, this statute applies only if a paternity affidavit has not already been executed pursuant to Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1. To say that judicial action can trump a valid paternity affidavit even if the parties have not complied with Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1 is to render that statute meaningless, which is a result that should be avoided.