Brown, J.
Bradford M. Crowder appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He raises four issues which we consolidate as whether the postconviction court erred in denying his petition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On April 19, 2011, the State charged Crowder with Count I, child molesting as a class A felony, and other counts including child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, child exploitation, and vicarious sexual gratification.
On August 12, 2011, Crowder entered a plea agreement… Crowder would plead guilty to all of the charges except for child molesting as a class A felony …
Also on August 12, 2011, the court held a hearing. … Crowder indicated that he understood he was giving up his right to appeal his sentence. …
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The court sentenced Crowder to … an aggregate sentence of sixty-one years.
On September 17, 2012, Crowder filed a petition for post-conviction relief. … On October 7, 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss … On November 20, 2015, this Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice. On January 22, 2016, this Court denied Crowder’s petition for rehearing and stated that the appeal remained dismissed.
On June 8, 2016, Crowder filed an amendment to his petition for postconviction relief which alleged that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
On September 30, 2016, the court held a hearing on Crowder’s petition. …
… When asked if he advised Crowder that he was “not really getting much of a benefit for the dismissal of the A Felony,” trial counsel answered, “I didn’t because again, I didn’t read it that way because her assessment that she could still technically proceed on the victim’s prior statement as often occurs when victims, even another context, recant or change their statement as to certain factors involved in the case.” …
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Crowder testified that his trial counsel did not explain that the State said they would dismiss the A felony due to the victim’s clarification of her age and that he did not recall his attorney explaining the appellate waiver in the plea agreement. When asked if he would have accepted the plea with the appellate waiver if he knew he was not receiving a benefit for the waiver, Crowder answered, “Absolutely not.” He stated that he would have considered the other plea or gone to trial. ….
On March 22, 2017, the court denied Crowder’s petition. …
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Crowder argues that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary where he did not know the dismissal of the charge of child molesting as a class A felony was due to a lack of evidence and that he received no material benefit while also waiving his appellate rights. … ….
Because Crowder was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, we analyze his claims under Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 2001). Segura categorizes two main types of ineffective assistance of counsel cases. … The second relates to “an improper advisement of penal consequences,” and this category has two subcategories: (1) “claims of intimidation by exaggerated penalty or enticement by an understated maximum exposure;” or (2) “claims of incorrect advice as to the law.” Crowder’s claim, which is that his trial counsel failed to advise him that the open plea provided no benefit, appears to fall under the second category.
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We note that Crowder’s amendment to his petition asserted that his counsel should have advised him to not accept a plea agreement that waived his appellate rights when he received no benefit for the waiver. While Crowder’s post-hearing brief stated that the proper remedy was for the plea to be vacated, we conclude that he did not explicitly waive the remedy of severing the provision related to the waiver of his right to appeal his sentence from the plea agreement in the event that the post-conviction court found that vacation of the plea agreement was not warranted. …
… Under these circumstances, we reverse the post-conviction court’s finding that Crowder waived the alternative remedy of permitting him to pursue an appeal of his sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order to the extent it upheld the plea agreement and reverse that portion of the court’s order finding that Crowder waived the remedy of permitting him to pursue an appeal of his sentence.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.