Bailey, J.
Robert Wilder (“Wilder”) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of battery resulting in bodily injury, as a Class A misdemeanor, and the term of his probation that prohibits him from possessing firearms. …
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… At the June 5 sentencing hearing, the State requested a no-contact order. Wilder did not object to the issuance of a no-contact order, but he asked the court to remove from its terms the prohibition on possessing a firearm, as this case did not involve the use of any firearm. The trial court imposed a 365-day sentence, all suspended to probation except for time served. The court imposed standard conditions of probation which included a condition that Wilder “not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon or live in a residence where there are such items.” The court also imposed a no-contact order as a condition of probation, which included an order that Wilder “have no firearms, deadly weapons, or ammunition in his/her possession.” …
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Wilder maintains that the condition of probation that prohibits him from possessing firearms during his probation period violates his right to bear arms, as protected by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution. …
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The crime Wilder committed—battery resulting in bodily injury—was, by definition, a crime of violence. I.C. § 35-42-2-1(d)(1). …
The fact that Wilder’s violent crime did not involve use of a firearm is not dispositive; it is the propensity of the probationer toward violence that is relevant to the need to prohibit possession of dangerous weapons such as firearms. …
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The Second Amendment states in its entirety: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” … The United States Supreme Court has held that the “core protection” of the Second Amendment is “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding Second Amendment protections are applicable to the states). However, some categorical exclusions on firearm possession may be constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27) …
The federal courts use a two-pronged approach when analyzing a Second Amendment challenge to a law: (1) Does the challenged law impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee? If not, the inquiry is complete. (2) If it does impose such a burden, does the law pass a heightened level of scrutiny? See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2011), and cases cited therein. …
Here, the state statute authorizing a prohibition on possession of firearms as a probation condition, generally, seems to allow a categorical ban on firearm possession by any probationer, regardless of the nature of the underlying crime. I.C. § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(9). However, we do not decide whether such a categorical exclusion is constitutional, as Wilder challenges only the law as applied to him. As applied to Wilder, the law prohibits possession of firearms by a probationer who committed a violent crime—i.e., battery.
Since the probation condition burdens Wilder’s right to bear arms, we must determine what level of scrutiny to apply to that burden. In making this determination, we note that the prohibition on possession of firearms is not an indefinite one; rather, it applies only during the term of Wilder’s probation period, which was only 365 days. Thus, the condition is a more “modest burden” on Wilder’s right to bear arms. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
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The temporary curtailment of Wilder’s right to bear arms is substantially related to the government’s important goal of keeping dangerous weapons out of the hands of probationers who have shown a propensity for violence. Therefore, the challenged probation condition, as applied to Wilder, does not violate the Second Amendment.
Wilder contends that the challenged probation condition, as applied to him, also violates Article 1, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution, which states: “The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.” Claims under that provision are analyzed differently than Second Amendment claims. As we have most recently held, we apply both a rational basis review and a material burden analysis to such claims. Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 832-35. …
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Here, the challenged firearm restriction passes rational basis review for the same reasons it passed an intermediate level of scrutiny under the federal constitution. The State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wilder committed a violent crime. …
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Here, as in Redington, the challenged restriction does not impose a substantial obstacle on Wilder’s right to bear arms for self-defense because the restriction is temporary, lasting only while Wilder is serving his one-year probation. …
Moreover, again as in Redington, even if we found the magnitude of the impairment on the right to bear arms was substantial, Wilder’s challenge would still fail on the second component of the material burden test because his possession of firearms during probation would threaten to inflict “particularized harm” on others.
Because Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(9), as applied to Wilder, has a rational basis and does not impose a material burden on Wilder’s right to bear arms, it does not violate Article 1, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution.
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Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.