Crone, J.
When R.R., a seventeen-year-old juvenile, did not appear for the combined factfinding hearings in his juvenile delinquency and probation violation cases, the trial court held the hearings in his absence and found that he committed the charged offenses and violated his probation. R.R. now appeals, arguing that he had a constitutional right to be present at the hearings and that the trial court violated that right by holding them in his absence. … R.R. argues that under the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1, he could not validly waive that right because he was not emancipated.
We hold that although juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at factfinding hearings in delinquency and probation proceedings, the trial court had the authority to find R.R. to be in a position of procedural default under the particular facts of this case, where R.R. knowingly and intentionally refused to appear. The legislature would not have intended for the juvenile waiver statute to allow nearly emancipated young adults to ignore trial court orders and thwart the operation of the juvenile justice system by intentionally refusing to appear at dispositional hearings. Therefore, we affirm.
….
… Thus, when a defendant knows of the trial date but fails to appear, the trial court may presume that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to be present at the trial and try the defendant in absentia. Brown v. State, 839 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (2006). …
….
… on appeal, R.R. again offers no explanation for his absence. As such, the record viewed in its entirety, including R.R.’s familiarity with and pattern of noncompliance with the juvenile justice system at the time of his factfinding hearings, the fact that he knew about the pick-up order, and his failure to provide an explanation for his absence, supports the conclusion that R.R.’s absence from the February 7 factfinding hearings was knowing and voluntary. …
In his reply brief, R.R. cites the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1, which reads as follows:
Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
….
(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:
(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and
(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or IC 31-37-19-27,[5] by virtue of having married, or in accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.) R.R. observes that neither his counsel nor his mother waived his right to be present at the factfinding hearings, and he argues that he could not validly waive that right pursuant to the statute because he was not emancipated.
Under R.R.’s interpretation of the juvenile waiver statute, unemancipated juveniles could hijack trial court dockets and avoid responsibility for their delinquent behavior by knowingly and voluntarily (and repeatedly) refusing to appear at factfinding hearings. We can safely say that our legislature would not have intended such an absurd result when it enacted the statute back in 1997. See State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Super. Ct., Room Three, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind. 1986) (stating that courts cannot presume that legislature “intended to do an absurd thing”). … By refusing to appear for a factfinding hearing, an unemancipated juvenile defaults on his court-ordered obligation, and he cannot rely on the juvenile waiver statute to rescue him from this default. See Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 497 … In sum, we conclude that the legislature would not have intended for the juvenile waiver statute to apply in this situation. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Vaidik, C.J., dissents with opinion.
Vaidik, Chief Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the majority that juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at delinquency and probation fact-finding hearings. But my agreement with the majority ends here.
Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1, the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute, governs the waiver of “any rights” guaranteed to a child under the United States and Indiana Constitutions and sets forth three ways that waiver can occur:
Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
….
(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:
(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and
(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or IC 31-37-19-27, by virtue of having married, or in accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.
(Emphases added). I believe that Section 31-32-5-1 is unambiguous and therefore must be given its clear and plain meaning. … Under the plain meaning of this statute, any right guaranteed to a child by the constitution (which we all agree includes the right to be present at delinquency and probation fact-finding hearings) may be waived in only one of three ways, and if one of these three ways is not satisfied, the right simply may not be waived.
In addition, I believe that reading the statute this way fits in with the structure of the juvenile code as a whole: to protect children. … The juvenile-justice system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents; this is because children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004). …
… The Indiana Supreme Court recently examined the absurdity doctrine in Calvin v. State, No. 02S03-1709-CR-611 (Ind. Dec. 21, 2017). …Our Supreme Court—acknowledging that the absurdity doctrine is “strong medicine” that can defeat the plain meaning of statutes—concluded that the absurdity doctrine did not apply. Slip op. at 5. …
I believe that many of these same concerns apply here and that this case likewise “falls outside the doctrine’s boundaries” given the plain meaning of Section 31-32-5-1. Id. at 7. …
… Because it is undisputed that R.R. did not waive his right to be present pursuant to one of the three ways set forth in Section 31-32-5-1, I would reverse the juvenile court and remand this case for further proceedings.