Brown, J.
Whitaker appeals the imposition of fees by the probation department. He raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in releasing his bond in the amount of $740. …
… The court held a bench trial and found Whitaker guilty of domestic battery.
On May 2, 2017, the court held a sentencing hearing for the conviction … as well as a hearing on a plea to invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor … The court found Whitaker guilty of invasion of privacy … and stated: “I’ll find you indigent for fines and costs and close out this matter.” … The court sentenced him to 365 days with 359 days suspended, placed him on probation for 359 days, and ordered him to complete a substance abuse evaluation and treatment. …
The same day, the court entered a sentencing order …“The Court is assessing Court Costs and Fees in the amount of $0.00 and a Monetary Award (if applicable) in the amount of $. … Under the preprinted headings “MONETARY OBLIGATIONS” and “Court Costs and Fees,” the value of “$0.00” and total value of “$0.00” are listed.
An order of probation was also filed that same day, providing:
Special Conditions
In addition to the monetary conditions, you must also pay the costs of any of the following Court-ordered programs as directed.
Substance Abuse Evaluation & Treatment
* * * * *
Sliding Scale for Probation Fees / DVC Classes / SAET
A Bond Release Memo filed on June 2, 2017, from a probation officer addressed to the trial court, states in part:
A bond was posted with the Marion County Clerk’s Office on the behalf of the above named defendant and cause. The defendant currently owes monetary obligations under this Cause in the amount of $740.00.
The probation Department respectfully requests that the bond be transferred to the Marion Superior Court Probation Department to apply towards the outstanding balance of fees, costs and fines under this Cause. …
An order dated June 5, 2017, approved the request and states in part “Bond to be given to MCCC in the amount of $740.” …
… Whitaker argues that it was error for the probation department to assess fees in the amount of $740 when the trial court did not impose those fees as a condition of probation. He asserts that the facts of this case are similar to those in De La Cruz v. State, 80 N.E.3d 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), Burnett v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), and Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). …
The State argues that the trial court imposed probation fees and that Marion County LR49-CR00-115 creates an allowable presumption of the imposition of probation fees when an individual is convicted of a crime. …
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In De La Cruz v. State, we addressed a similar situation. …
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… In our decision, we noted that there was no court judgment for probation fees, only a probation department assessment of fees, and that De La Cruz did “not appeal a trial court judgment of fees; rather, he appeal[ed] the trial court order allowing the probation department to assess such fees.” … We observed that Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(e) states that “the court may order” the defendant to pay not more than certain specified maximum amounts for specified fees, including user and administrative fees, “to either the probation department or the clerk,” and that subsection (f) states that “the probation department . . . shall collect” those fees. … We also observed that Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7(b) states that “[a] probation department may petition a court” to “impose” or “increase” a person’s probation fees. … We noted that we had recently held that those statutes give “the trial court, not the probation department, . . . the discretion to impose probation fees.” Id. (quoting Burnett v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1221, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added)).
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In accordance with Coleman, Burnett, and De La Cruz, we conclude that the trial court did not order probation fees and that it abused its discretion when it authorized the probation department to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the order that the bond be given to MCCC in the amount of $740, and we remand with instructions to vacate the probation fees and order reimbursement of those fees from the probation department. …
Reversed and remanded.
Najam, J., and Kirsch, J, concur.