Brown, J.
George A. Buskirk (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order finding a postnuptial agreement unenforceable and ordering that he pay Maureen Buskirk (“Wife”) maintenance and her attorney fees. He raises two issues which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Wife. We reverse.
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“It has long been held that antenuptial agreements are valid and binding ‘so long as they are entered into freely and without fraud, duress, or misrepresentation and are not, under the particular circumstances of the case, unconscionable.’” Hall v. Hall, 27 N.E.3d 281, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting In re Marriage of Boren, 475 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied. “[W]e have concluded that the same should apply to reconciliation agreements made between parties in order to preserve the marriage.” Id. (citing Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied).
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While the Agreement states at one point that neither party “contemplates a dissolution of the marriage at any time,” it also mentions “mutual waivers and releases of the parties which might or could devolve upon them in the event an action for divorce were filed . . . .” Appellee’s Appendix Volume II at 6. The Agreement also states: “[I]n order to better effect harmonious domestic tranquility Husband and Wife desire to resolve their respective rights in the estates of the other during the lifetime of the parties hereto and have reached an agreement concerning the respective rights that each party claims in the property of the other.” Id. (emphasis added). Under the circumstances, we conclude that Husband’s affidavit, which alleged that the parties had a disagreement, that Wife left home for several days, that they discussed ending the marriage as a result of the disagreement, that they decided that making an agreement about keeping their property and income separate would solve their disagreement allow their marriage to continue, and that they signed the Agreement, can be considered to show the nature of the consideration supporting the contract and that the affidavit raises an issue of fact regarding consideration. Moreover, we observe that the Agreement contains mutual releases which constitute consideration. See generally 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 155 (“The mutual promises of a husband and wife may constitute a sufficient consideration to support a postnuptial marital agreement.”); see also Greensburg Water Co. v. Lewis, 189 Ind. 439, 128 N.E. 103, 107 (1920) (“It has been held that the relinquishment by both parties of their respective rights under the contract is a sufficient consideration to support an agreement by each party to absolve the other from all obligations imposed by the contract; or, as more frequently stated, the mutual release from the obligations of the old contract is an adequate consideration for the rescission.”). Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Wife summary judgment on this basis.
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Paragraph 2 of the Agreement states that the consideration consists, in part, of “the mutual waivers and releases of the parties which might or could devolve upon them in the event an action for divorce were filed by either party culminating in divorce and a Court of Law to make distribution of the rights of the parties.” Appellee’s Appendix Volume II at 6. Thus, the Agreement specifically addresses releases of rights in the event of divorce. We also observe that Paragraph 5 of the Agreement provides that “Husband and Wife shall have the absolute right to manage, dispose of, or otherwise deal with any property now separately owned, or hereafter separately acquired, in any manner whatsoever, and may enjoy and dispose of such property in the same manner as if the marriage had not taken place.” Id. at 9. It is undisputed that after signing the Agreement the parties did not acquire joint property or debt and did not file joint tax returns. We conclude that the Agreement sets forth the parties’ intent to waive any right to property of the other including spousal maintenance and attorney fees in a dissolution of their marriage.
Conclusion
The Agreement was entered into as a reconciliation agreement, was made with valid consideration, set forth the parties’ intent to waive any rights to property of the other, and is enforceable. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order.
Reversed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.