May, J.
Charles A. Edmonson, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues the post-conviction court erred in concluding his petition was barred by the doctrine of laches. We agree the court’s finding of laches was clearly erroneous because the State did not demonstrate it was prejudiced. Nevertheless, we affirm the court’s denial of Edmonson’s petition because, as the post-conviction court also found, Indiana law did not require Edmonson be advised of all possible collateral consequences of his guilty plea for that plea to have been entered voluntarily.
In August 1993, pursuant to a plea agreement, Edmonson pled guilty to Class B misdemeanor public intoxication and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief (“misdemeanor convictions”). The court accepted Edmonson’s guilty plea and sentenced Edmonson to serve 180 days on each count, concurrently, in the Indiana Department of Correction. The court … placed Edmonson on one year of probation.
While on probation, Edmonson committed murder. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to sixty years in prison. See Edmonson v. State, 667 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. 1996) … In sentencing Edmonson, the trial court found as an aggravator “Edmonson’s prior convictions for offenses related to alcohol.”
On March 8, 2016, while still serving his sentence for murder, Edmonson filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his misdemeanor convictions. … Specifically, Edmonson argued both his counsel and the trial court “failed to advise him of the future consequences” of his guilty plea—i.e., that his misdemeanor convictions “would be used as an aggravator in a future sentence.”
The post-conviction court held a hearing on Edmonson’s petition on August 18, 2016. The State raised the affirmative defense of laches and argued Edmonson’s petition also fails on the merits. The court summarily denied Edmonson’s petition for post-conviction relief after announcing at the hearing both that the State had demonstrated Edmonson’s petition was barred by the doctrine of laches and that Indiana law did not entitle Edmonson to an advisement of possible future collateral consequences of his guilty plea.
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… To prove laches, the State must show both (1) the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief, and (2) the State has been prejudiced by the delay.
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Because Edmonson waited twenty-three years after his misdemeanor convictions to file his petition, had knowledge of any alleged defect in his misdemeanor convictions, and had the means to pursue a petition during that time, his delay was unreasonable. … We turn next to whether the State was prejudiced by this delay.
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While we can speculate that prejudice may exist given merely the length of time Edmonson delayed, the State has failed to provide any evidence from which an inference may be drawn. Given the complete lack of evidence provided by the State, the State has failed to meet its burden to show prejudice exists. See Lacy v. State, 491 N.E.2d 520, 521-22 (Ind. 1986) …
At the hearing, the post-conviction court also found that Edmonson had not been entitled, before he pled guilty in 1993, to an advisement that those misdemeanor convictions “could, ultimately be held against you as an aggravator in a murder case. No one knows that you’re gonna [sic] be committing any future acts in this case.” …
The advisements a defendant must receive before pleading guilty have been set out by our legislature:
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Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(a)…
Contrary to Edmonson’s claim, the sentencing court was not required to advise him that the possibility existed that his conviction could be considered in a subsequent case and impact his sentence in that later case. …
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Accordingly, we affirm.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.