May, J.
Trevor L. Morgan appeals the revocation of his direct placement in community corrections. He alleges Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 is unconstitutional and he was denied due process. We affirm and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2010, Morgan pled guilty to Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class C felony neglect of a dependent. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty years, with ten years suspended to probation.
In February 2013, Morgan requested and was granted placement in a community transition program. However, he violated the terms and was ordered to serve two years of the suspended portion of his sentence “on the Work Release Program under supervision of Vigo County Community Corrections.”
On January 4, 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke Morgan’s placement in the work release program. The State alleged he had committed nine violations of the program rules, including being in an unauthorized area, refusing an order, working outside an approved area, and escaping the facility. The trial court conducted a hearing on the allegations. …
The trial court found Morgan committed the violations and revoked his placement in the program. The trial court ordered Morgan to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”).
Morgan asserts amended Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 (2015), which controls the community corrections program, is unconstitutional because it impermissibly delegates judicial authority to a member of the executive branch, i.e. the community corrections director, and because it permits revocation of community corrections placements without an “evidentiary hearing before a neutral and detached magistrate.” …
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Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 (2015) states:
If a person who is placed under this chapter violates the terms of the placement, the community corrections director may do any of the following:
(1) Change the terms of the placement.
(2) Continue the placement.
(3) Reassign a person assigned to a specific community corrections program to a different community corrections program.
(4) Request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or department of correction for the remainder of the persons sentence.
The community corrections director shall notify the court if the director changes the terms of the placement, continues the placement, or reassigns the person to a different program.
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To decide whether a governmental branch’s powers have been delegated elsewhere, we first determine if the statute “has the effect of a coercive influence on the perceived usurped branch of government.” A.B. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied. Such influence is prohibited by Article 3, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, id., which specifically prohibits one governmental branch from exercising the powers of the others. Ind. Const. Art. 3, sec. 1. …
The statute in question here does not act as a coercive influence on the judiciary’s ability to discharge its duties. The trial court sentenced Morgan to twenty years with ten years suspended. The trial court allowed Morgan to be placed on probation in 2013 but he violated the rules of that program. After hearing evidence and finding Morgan committed those violations, the court ordered Morgan to serve two years of his suspended sentence “on the Work Release Program under supervision of Vigo County Community Corrections.”
With the statute at issue, the community corrections director is given the ability to manage the community corrections program but not to revoke placement or resentence participants. Although the community corrections director can recommend revocation of placement, it remains the trial court’s duty to determine whether revocation will be ordered. See Madden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) … Morgan has not demonstrated an improper delegation of the judiciary’s duty to sentence convicted persons.
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Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 does not impermissibly delegate judicial power to the executive branch. To the extent that the amended code section does not explicitly require a hearing, one is nevertheless required by other statutes and caselaw. Morgan was given a hearing which comported with the principles of due process. Therefore, we affirm and remand for determination of any credit time due to Morgan.
Affirmed and remanded.
Barnes, J., and Bradford, J., concur.