Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issues
In July of 2015, the Sheriff of Boone County, Indiana, sent a letter to his county’s registered sex offenders informing them of the passage of Indiana’s “serious sex offender” law. This law prohibits “serious sex offenders” from entering “school property.” Under the Boone County Sheriff and Prosecutor’s (the “State”) interpretation of the statute and the definition of “school property,” “serious sex offenders” cannot attend church, without facing arrest and prosecution, if their church conducts Sunday school or has child care for children of the ages described in the statute.
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 (collectively, “Appellants”) are residents of Boone County and are “serious sex offenders” pursuant to the statute. Desiring to attend church, Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging their churches are not “school property” within the meaning of the statute, and, if they are “school property,” the statute violates Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by placing a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants’ requested relief but for a declaration they may attend church when Sunday school or child care is not being actively conducted on the premises.
Appellants now appeal, raising three issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court erred in concluding the churches are “school property” at any time; 2) if the churches are “school property,” whether the statute and the State’s efforts to enforce the statute violate RFRA; and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ request for a permanent injunction. The State cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred in concluding the churches are not “school property” when they are not actively conducting Sunday school or child care. Concluding the Appellants’ churches are not “school property” within the meaning of the statute, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order granting Appellants’ motion for a permanent injunction. [Footnote omitted.]
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The question before this court is whether Appellants’ churches, which offer Sunday school and/or child care services for children in the relevant age group, meet the statutory definition of “school property.” Appellants argue they do not fit within this definition because the “plain text of the statute and a common sense understanding of a ‘school’ speaks in terms of distinct educational entities . . . [and] does not become a school simply because it offers ‘some program or service’ oriented towards children.” Brief of Appellants at 31. By contrast, the State argues a church offering Sunday school for children of the relevant age group falls squarely within the statute’s definition and our legislature’s intent; the State alleges a church operates without the goal of profiting and Sunday school is plainly operated “to serve . . . or otherwise benefit” children. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 31. Further, at oral argument, the State argued that nurseries or babysitting services operated by the churches are “developmental child care program[s]” because children are learning to socialize. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-285(1)(D)(iii). The State further argued the only way Appellants can attend church is if no children are present at a church’s service. We disagree with the broad interpretation of “school property” advocated by the State.
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In considering the structure of the statute and viewing it as a whole, we cannot say the legislature intended to prohibit Appellants or other “serious sex offenders” from entering church property if that church offers Sunday school or child care services for children in the relevant age group….
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In sum, Appellants’ churches are not “school property” and they do not become “school property” by virtue of conducting Sunday school or offering child care services for children who are three years old but not yet enrolled in kindergarten.
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Conclusion
We conclude Appellants’ churches are not “school property” at any time within the meaning of Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-285(1)(D) and the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion for a permanent injunction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Appellants relief and remand with instructions to enter a permanent injunction in favor of Appellants prohibiting the State from arresting and/or prosecuting them for entering their churches.
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.