Barnes, J.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court properly denied Tibbs’s motion to transfer his case to juvenile court after he was found not guilty of murder.
The State charged Tibbs as an adult with murder, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm, and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. … At the murder trial, Tibbs claimed self-defense, and the jury was instructed on that defense. The jury acquitted Tibbs of murder but found him guilty of Level 6 felony obstruction of justice and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.
After the jury’s verdict but before the trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Tibbs, he petitioned to have his case transferred to juvenile court for adjudication and disposition. …
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… The trial court did not issue a written order denying Tibbs’s motion to transfer, but the denial is reflected in the chronological case summary.
Tibbs’s specific claim on appeal is that the trial court was required to enter findings explaining why it denied his motion to transfer his case to juvenile court and that the trial court’s oral statement at the conclusion of the hearing on his motion was inadequate. Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-4 provides in part: …
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the court having adult criminal jurisdiction may withhold judgment and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition. …
The language under which Tibbs filed his motion—subsection (c) of the statute—was enacted in 2016 and has not yet been the subject of an appellate opinion. Here, Tibbs had to be charged in adult court for murder under subsection (a)(2). But, when he was acquitted of that charge and only convicted of obstruction of justice and misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, he was eligible for consideration of what might be called a “reverse transfer” to juvenile court for disposition, rather than being convicted and sentenced in adult court.
The “reverse transfer” statute states that a trial court “may withhold judgment and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition” after consideration of several enumerated factors. “The term ‘may’ in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion.” Tongate v. State, 954 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. …
Tibbs does not directly challenge the merits of the trial court’s ruling. The narrow inquiry here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not entering more detailed findings supporting its decision to deny Tibbs’s “reverse transfer” petition. Effectively, Tibbs contends the trial court misinterpreted the law as not requiring detailed findings and that we should remand for the entry of such findings. We disagree.
… The “reverse transfer” statute contains no requirement that the trial court enter findings. If the legislature had wanted to require such findings, it knows how to do so. … In fact, there is an express statutory requirement for a trial court to enter findings in support of a discretionary decision to waive a juvenile into adult court. Ind. Code § 31-30-3-10. The legislature chose not to enact such a requirement for a “reverse waiver,” and we will not read one into the statute.
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Aside from sentencing decisions, trial courts in Indiana generally have no obligation to enter findings in support of their rulings in criminal cases. See Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind. 1998). Tibbs contends that the importance of a “reverse waiver” ruling should necessitate findings in support of the denial of such a petition. Although such a ruling is indeed important, it is not more so than a ruling on a motion to suppress, the outcome of which could determine whether a prosecution can proceed, and which does not require findings. Id. In fact, a trial court is not even required to enter findings to support a judgment of conviction following a bench trial, which is the most consequential decision a trial court can make. See Miller v. State, 72 N.E.3d 502, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 77 N.E.3d 1196, 1197 (Ind. 2017). We decline to impose a requirement that trial courts enter findings in support of rulings on a motion for “reverse waiver” under Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-4(c).
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Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.