Pyle, J.
On February 21, 2014, Robinson fled on foot from the police, and, in an attempt to evade the police, approached the door of a stranger’s home, beat on the door to try and gain entry, and broke the door knob. Thereafter, the State charged Robinson … with the following: (1) felony attempted residential entry; (2) felony possession of methamphetamine; (3) felony unlawful possession of a syringe; (4) misdemeanor possession of marijuana; (5) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; and (6) misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State also alleged that Robinson was: (7) an habitual offender; and (8) an habitual substance offender.
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On July 23, 2015, Robinson pled guilty to felony attempted residential entry, and he admitted that he was an habitual substance offender. In return for Robinson’s guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining five charges and the habitual offender allegation against him. … The trial court accepted his guilty pleas and entered judgments of conviction. …
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Prior to the trial court’s imposition of Robinson’s sentence, the prosecutor pointed out that there was an anomaly in the fact that Robinson had pled guilty to the attempted residential entry charge and the habitual substance offender allegation. The prosecutor stated that “in order for the Habitual Substance Offender to work he needed [to] have plead[ed] to a substance related offense” and that “[t]he Attempted Residential Entry was more appropriate for the Habitual Offender enhancement” with which Robinson had also been charged. …
The trial court interrupted and stated that it was “just not inclined to at this point to reopen this matter” … The trial court then reiterated its acceptance of Robinson’s guilty plea to the felony attempted residential entry and the habitual substance offender allegation, and it imposed a three (3) year executed sentence for Robinson’s felony attempted residential entry conviction. …
… Thereafter, on March 3, 2016, the trial court held the supplemental sentencing hearing to determine the habitual substance offender enhancement. … The State recommended that the trial court sentence Robinson to three years on the habitual substance offender allegation and “run [it] consecutive” to the felony attempted residential entry sentence. The trial court stated that it was going to adopt the State’s recommendation, and it then imposed a separate sentence of three (3) years with one and one-half (1½) years executed and one and one-half (1½) years suspended to probation. …
Robinson argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue his sentencing hearing; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate. We will not, however, address these issues because we sua sponte conclude that Robinson’s habitual substance offender adjudication and enhancement of a non-substance offense was illegal or contrary to statute, making remand necessary. See Reffett v. State, 844 N.E.2d 1072, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) …
At the time of Robinson’s offenses, the habitual substance offender statute … provided that the State could “seek to have a person sentenced as an habitual substance offender for any substance offense by alleging … that the person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated substance offense convictions.” I.C. § 35-50-2-10(b) … Once a defendant was determined to be an habitual substance offender—whether at trial or by guilty plea—the trial court was then required to “sentence the person found to be an habitual substance offender to an additional fixed term of at least three (3) years but not more than eight (8) years imprisonment,” with that sentence enhancement to be added to the sentence imposed on the underlying substance offense. …
Here, Robinson pled guilty to the non-substance offense of attempted residential entry and admitted to being an habitual substance offender. …
… We recognize that defendant “‘may not enter a plea agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then later complain that it was an illegal sentence.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004) … Here, however, Robinson pled guilty under an open plea and did not agree to a specified sentence. Thus, the trial court was required to sentence Robinson in accordance with the prevailing law and statutes at that time. See Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ind. 2013) …
Because the trial court entered an illegal sentence, we must remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Generally, when the trial court errs in its sentencing on an habitual substance offender enhancement, we would remand for the trial court to resentence in accordance with the law. See, e.g., Young, 901 N.E.2d at 626… Here, however, it was the plea agreement itself that was contrary to legal and statutory authority. …
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and plea agreement and remand with instructions to enter a new plea agreement and sentence that comply with the relevant statutory authority, or, if the parties cannot reach such an agreement, then the trial court should set the matter for further proceedings. …
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.