Barnes, J.
Case Summary
Robert Muldowney appeals the trial court’s grant of judgment in favor of Lincoln Park, LLC, and Robert Versprille. We dismiss and remand.
Issue
The issue Muldowney raises is whether Versprille provided adequate notice for the termination of Muldowney’s lease of a rental property from Lincoln Park. We also address an issue raised by Lincoln Park and Versprille, namely, whether the trial court conducted an adequate hearing on their eviction suit.
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We acknowledge that small claims trials should be informal…
Here, the trial court’s informality went too far. It did not allow either party the opportunity to present documentary evidence or sworn testimony in support of their respective positions. Rather, it appears to have based its judgment strictly upon the facts alleged in the complaint and unsworn statements of Muldowney’s counsel and Versprille. We do not even have a copy of the original lease before us. Also, it should have been apparent, based on counsel’s motion to dismiss and supporting argument, that the facts of the case were not straightforward and that each party should have been allowed to present evidence to support its claims before the trial court spontaneously ruled against Muldowney.
We might be able to overlook this disregard of basic procedure if the trial court’s judgment was unquestionably correct, even if all the facts were as Muldowney alleged regarding a month-to-month lease. But we cannot reach that conclusion. Muldowney contends that his occupancy of the residence after June 30, 2016, was a month-to-month tenancy under the express language of the lease (which, again, is not in the record). Also, he directs us to Indiana Code Section 32-31-1-2, which states, “A general tenancy in which the premises are occupied by the express or constructive consent of the landlord is considered to be a tenancy from month to month. . . .”
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Our supreme court has disapproved of trial courts conducting “summary” proceedings unless the court establishes on the record affirmative agreement from represented parties’ attorneys that the proceedings will be conducted summarily, and affirmative agreement by both represented clients or pro se litigants to summary proceedings. See Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 743 (Ind. 2015). [Footnote omitted.] The trial court here did not obtain anyone’s consent before summarily ruling in Lincoln Hills and Versprille’s favor. Although small claims hearings are to be informal, neither are they normally to be “summary” in the sense of entirely dispensing with the presentation of evidence in support of a claim. The manner in which the trial court acted here deprived Lincoln Hills and Versprille of the chance to present evidence to meet its burden of proof against Muldowney.
We conclude that we should remand this case for further proceedings and the conducting of a proper, if informal, evidentiary hearing. See Iltzsch v. State, 981 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind. 2015) (remanding to allow State to present evidence supporting restitution request where defendant did not object to fact of restitution and State presented insufficient evidence to support restitution amount); Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (remanding for trial court to conduct new hearing on protective order request where trial court did not permit petitioner to testify or to cross-examine defendant). We acknowledge that this case may be moot in one sense, as Muldowney seems to concede he had to move out of the Lincoln Hills residence by October 31, 2016. However, a different move-out date may affect a calculation of damages, and Lincoln Hills and Versprille make no argument that the case is moot.
Conclusion
We elect to dismiss this appeal without prejudice. We remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Lincoln Hills and Versprille’s complaint and to thereafter rule on it accordingly. Then, either party may initiate a new appeal if they so desire. [Footnote omitted.]
Dismissed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.