David, J.
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In February 2016, Robin Boyer’s 2003 Chevy Trailblazer was stolen from in front of her apartment in Indianapolis. … Approximately 5 hours later, Boyer’s vehicle was located by police. Defendant, Justine Archer, was driving it. Red paint was found on the front of the vehicle, on the vehicle identification number (VIN) inside the vehicle, and on a section of the window covering the VIN.
Archer was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony Auto Theft. Archer pled guilty as charged. As part of the plea agreement, Archer waived the right to appeal the sentence imposed as long as the trial court sentenced her within the terms of the agreement. The agreement provided that Archer make restitution, but left the amount of restitution blank. … The parties could not agree on a restitution amount, so the trial court held a restitution hearing.
At the hearing, Boyer … presented evidence that repairs and replacements from the spray-painting would cost $5,240.32. …
The trial court ordered Archer to pay $5,240.32 in restitution. Archer was to pay this in monthly payments of $25.00.
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The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Archer did not waive her appeal because “the amount of restitution was not fixed nor did the parties specifically agree to give the trial court the discretion to determine the amount of restitution without any prospect for appellate review.” Archer v. State, 71 N.E.3d 834, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 2017 WL 1900307 (Ind. May 2, 2017). …
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Plea agreements are contracts and once the trial court accepts it, a plea agreement and its terms are binding upon the trial court, the State and the defendant. Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013). …
… Looking at the plain language of the agreement, Archer’s waiver of her right to appeal is conditioned upon the court sentencing her within the terms of the agreement. However, the agreement does not set forth the amount of restitution. Instead, this term is left blank. …
Archer argues and the Court of Appeals found that insufficient evidence supported the restitution order because no evidence showed that Archer herself was the one who spray-painted the victim’s vehicle. …
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Here, there is sufficient evidence that the spray-painting is a result of the underlying auto theft. … Indeed, Archer stole the vehicle and is responsible for the damage done to it while it was in her custody and control, including the spray-painting.
We also note again that Archer agreed to pay restitution here. … The only logical conclusion is that she agreed to pay for the spray-paint damage. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Archer to pay restitution for the spray-painting of Boyer’s vehicle.
Finally, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in light of Archer’s ability to pay. …
Whether a trial court needs to inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay depends on whether restitution is ordered as a condition of probation or is ordered as part of an executed sentence. When the trial court enters a restitution order as a condition of probation, it is required to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay in order to prevent an indigent defendant from being imprisoned because of a probation violation based on a defendant’s failure to pay restitution. Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008). However, when restitution is ordered as part of an executed sentence, no inquiry into defendant’s ability to pay is required because restitution is merely a money judgment and a defendant cannot be imprisoned for non-payment.
… Because Archer could only go to jail for failing to pay restitution if it were a condition of her probation, it is clear from the trial record that Archer’s order to pay restitution was a condition of her probation. Accordingly, the trial court was required to inquire into Archer’s ability to pay. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6).
Recently, in Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind. 2016), this Court provided guidance about what constitutes sufficient inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay restitution. We held that “where neither the defendant nor the State has provided any information or testimony regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, the trial court must make the necessary inquiry to meet its statutory obligation.” …
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court determined that, although Archer was in a difficult financial position, she agreed to pay restitution as part of her plea deal. The Court then ordered her to pay $25.00 per month, acknowledging that it could take years for Archer to pay the full amount of restitution, if she ever did, and telling Archer that the court would not put her in jail for non-payment, as long as she made a good faith effort to pay.
While Archer compares her situation to the one in Bell, there are two crucial differences between Bell and the present case. First, the defendant in Bell did not agree to pay restitution in a plea agreement like Archer did. … Second, the defendant in Bell presented evidence that her sole source of income was her monthly disability checks and that she had not worked in over twenty years. …
… While Archer may not be able to pay at present due to her circumstances, there is evidence in the record that she had worked previously and she indicated her hope that she will be able to get a job in the future. The trial court, fully aware of Archer’s financial situation and the fact that she may not be able to pay the restitution off for years, if ever, ordered her to pay a modest sum of $25.00 per month. Because Archer agreed to pay restitution and there is evidence in the record that she is able to work and hopes to secure employment in the future, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Archer to pay restitution.
… Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Rush, C.J., Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.