Bradford, J.
On the morning of May 9, 2014, Coty DeMoss and Kenneth Duerson were working on a traffic project on Interstate 69 in Marion County. DeMoss and Duerson were helping to dismantle an arrow board in order to open a closed lane of traffic. DeMoss and Duerson were completing this task when a truck driven by Appellant-Defendant Jordan Stafford crashed into the back of another truck parked at the worksite, pinning one of the workers between the arrow board and truck and killing them both. Stafford was ultimately convicted of two counts of reckless operation in a highway work zone causing death and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of ten years of incarceration.
….
Stafford contends that he cannot be convicted of and sentenced for the deaths of both DeMoss and Duerson. Although Stafford frames this a challenge based on constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, it is actually a challenge based on statutory interpretation and the Indiana common-law principle that one may not be convicted of and punished “for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished.” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002) (citation omitted). Stafford contends that because Indiana Code section 9-21-8-56 is written as a conduct-based, rather than result-based, statute, his conduct may sustain only one conviction, even though there were multiple victims.
….
In May of 2014, Indiana Code 9-21-8-56 provided, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) [A] person who recklessly operates a vehicle in the immediate vicinity of a highway work zone when workers are present commits a Class A misdemeanor. ….
….
(h) An offense under subsection (b), (c), (d), or (e) is a Class C felony if the offense results in the death of a worker in the worksite.
Stafford contends that because Indiana Code section 9-21-8-56 is a crime defined by the conduct required to commit it—and not by any particular result—two convictions for the same act of reckless driving are prohibited. While acknowledging the horrific results of Stafford’s recklessness, precedent requires that one of his two convictions be vacated.
In Kelly v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. granted and summarily affirmed, 539 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1989) (“Kelly I”), we reversed Kelly’s conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) causing serious bodily injury. The intoxicated Kelly was operating a tractor-trailer that became involved in an accident resulting in the death of one and the serious bodily injury of another. Kelly was tried and convicted of one count of OWI resulting in death and one count of OWI resulting in serious bodily injury.
We concluded that Kelly’s two convictions for one act of OWI could not stand …
….
The Indiana Supreme Court granted both parties’ transfer petitions and summarily affirmed our disposition. See Kelly v. State, 539 N.E.2d 25, 26 (Ind. 1989) (“This interpretation of the statute and this application of the statute by the Second District is a true reading of the statute.”) (“Kelly II”). The distinction between conduct- and result-based crimes has not been abandoned, and the Indiana Supreme Court has more recently applied it to reverse all but one of a defendant’s many arson convictions, even though the one fire he set had injured several persons. See Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind. 2006) …
Kelly II is clear on the distinction between conduct- and result-based offenses and remains the law in Indiana, as declared by the Indiana Supreme Court. …
Turning to Stafford’s challenge, we can discern no meaningful distinction between Indiana Code section 9-21-8-56 and the OWI statutes at issue in Kelly II. In both cases, the crime was complete when certain conduct occurred, without regard to results. …
Also like the former OWI statues, bad results serve only to enhance the penalty for the conduct proscribed in subsection 9-21-8-56(b). … As we did in Kelly II, we are compelled to conclude that Stafford committed one crime here, albeit one crime with multiple, horrific results.
….
Pursuant to the binding authority of Kelly II, we are required to vacate one of Stafford’s convictions for Class C felony reckless operation in a highway work zone causing death. Because we have vacated one of Stafford’s convictions, we do not reach his sentence challenge and, instead, remand for resentencing on the remaining conviction for Class C felony reckless operation in a highway work zone causing death. The trial court will impose the appropriate sentence as it sees fit under the facts of this case and the statutory sentencing range for this crime.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.