Sharpnack, Senior J.
Charged under one cause number with a count of obstruction of justice, one count of abuse of a corpse, two counts of false informing, and one count of failure to report a dead body, Lincoln Pickett was additionally charged, under a separate cause number, with one count of felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and one count of murder.
In this interlocutory appeal under both cause numbers, Pickett challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to bifurcate the proceedings to prevent the jury from hearing evidence of his prior conviction–Class C felony escape–potentially qualifying him as a serious violent felon (“SVF”) if he was in possession of a firearm. …
On January 24, 2016, Kathy Riggle reported to the Mitchell Police Department that her daughter, Kamie Ratcliff, also known as Kamie Brashear, was missing. Mitchell Police Officer Matt England received information that Kamie might be staying with Pickett and Jasmine Pickett at their home in Mitchell, Indiana, and followed up on that information. Eventually the State filed charges against Pickett under the two cause numbers which the court later consolidated for trial. Citing both cause numbers, Pickett moved to bifurcate the trial, with Phase I addressing all charges save for the SVF allegation, with Phase II addressing the SVF charge, alleging his prior conviction of escape.
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The State opposed Pickett’s motion, successfully gaining permission to amend the information to allege that Picket was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-4-6. The State also proposed an instruction based on Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.2740. The proposed instruction, rather than use the term “possession of firearm by serious violent felon”, designates the offense as “possession of firearm in violation of I.C. 35-47-4-5” and indicates that Escape is the prior conviction in question in this case. Citing Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), the State argued that the amendment to the information and the proposed instruction, deleting any reference to the term “serious violent felon,” would sufficiently reduce any prejudice to Pickett’s defense that might be caused by the jury hearing about a prior, qualifying conviction. …
Both parties agree that our review of the trial court’s decision on the issue of bifurcation is for an abuse of discretion. See Hines v. State, 794 N.E.2d 469, 47071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), adopted by Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 2004). …
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In Hines, a panel of this court determined that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse the defendant’s motion to bifurcate the proceedings on a robbery charge from a charge that the defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm as a serious violent felon. 794 N.E.2d at 474. Although there was evidence the defendant flashed a gun in the commission of the robbery, evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction, the nature of which is not disclosed, qualifying him for the SVF charge, was not necessary to establish the conviction for the underlying robbery offense. Our Supreme Court agreed. Hines, 801 N.E.2d at 635.
In the present case, Pickett’s prior conviction for escape has no relevance to the charges he presently faces; i.e., it did not tend to establish intent, motive, knowledge, plan, identity, or credibility. See Spearman, 744 N.E.2d at 547-48. The proposed instruction would be appropriate were the only charge against Pickett the SVF charge. The instruction avoids the use of the term “serious violent felon” by naming the prior qualifying felony and citing the statute. It would do nothing to ameliorate the prejudicial irrelevance in this case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Pickett’s motion to bifurcate the proceedings.
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.