Bailey, J.
Case Summary
The Sheriff of Starke County, Indiana recommended the termination of Deputy Robert Gray, Jr. (“Gray”) from the Starke County Sheriff’s Department after he slapped a pre-trial detainee. After a public hearing, the Starke County Sheriff’s Merit Board (“the Merit Board”) terminated Gray’s employment. The termination was upheld on judicial review and Gray now appeals that order. We affirm.
Issues
Gray presents two issues for review:
I. Whether, as a matter of law, a termination decision arising from an alleged violation of a law enforcement department rule on use of force must be determined with reference to the excessive force standard of objective reasonableness enunciated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); and
II. Whether the termination is reversible because the trial court erroneously found that the termination decision was supported by substantial evidence by reweighing evidence, assessing witness credibility, and making its own factual findings.
….
On appeal, Gray argues that the termination order must be reversed because he was entitled to – and did not receive – review of his use of force consistent with the guidance of Graham and Prymer although the Merit Board purportedly “invited [that] review.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Acknowledging that other Rule violations were found, he further argues that the other charges arose from and were essentially part of his use of force. [Footnote omitted.] At bottom, his contention is that an officer who uses force cannot be dismissed for conduct that is “objectively reasonable” and his conduct was objectively reasonable because J.S. had become “an attacker.” Appellant’s Brief at 26.
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Here, however, the Merit Board was not tasked with determining whether Gray was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties as that might bear some relationship to a criminal defense. The Merit Board was not involved in a tort claim or litigation involving an allegation that Gray had deprived J.S. of a constitutional right. Rather, the matter before the Merit Board for disposition was whether Gray should be disciplined for violation of department rules having a reasonable relationship to his fitness and capacity to hold the job of Deputy Sheriff.
Requiring that the Fourth Amendment analysis and standard be invoked in all cases where police unfitness to serve is alleged would not comport with the public policy of this State. We have said, “From the very nature of a policeman’s duties, his conduct in the community on and off duty must be above reproach.” Pope, 301 N.E.2d at 391. The wrongdoing need not rise to the level of a constitutional tort to be actionable. See Chesser v. City of Hammond, Indiana, 725 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (evidence supported dismissal for conduct unbecoming an officer where officer had “used an unreasonable and excessive amount of force against his wife” and “lack[ed] ability to control his temper in certain situations”). Here, the Merit Board was not required to evaluate the allegation regarding the “Use of Force” Rule, or derivative allegations, with specific reference to the Graham “objective reasonableness” standard. [Footnote omitted.]
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….Substantial evidence supports the Merit Board’s findings, and its decision to terminate Gray for violating departmental rules is not arbitrary and capricious.
Conclusion
The excessive force objective reasonableness standard, as contemplated in Graham and its progeny, may be instructive but does not provide a minimum threshold for termination of police employment when an allegation has been made that the officer violated an internal use of force rule. Gray has not shown that the Merit Board’s discharge decision was contrary to law on this basis. Gray has not shown that the decision is arbitrary and capricious as unsupported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed. Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.