Massa, J.
The Board of Commissioners of Union County (“Union County”) sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Transportation, and the Department itself (collectively “INDOT”) alleging that INDOT was negligent in its highway repair efforts, causing damage to several neighboring septic systems of Union County residents. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding Union County did not have standing to sue INDOT for injury done to its residents. We agree, and affirm.
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Union County Cannot Maintain Its Claim for Injunctive Relief Under Third-Party Standing Principles.
Union County also alleges a third-party interest in this suit, namely that INDOT’s actions “may impact other properties and may implicate a broader public health and safety concern for Union County, Indiana.”4 Appellant’s App. at 25. Unlike declaratory judgment actions, a party may seek equitable relief (such as an injunction) on the basis of third-party standing. Cf. Cittadine, 790 N.E.2d at 984 (holding public standing doctrine permitted action for emergency writ of mandamus). While the general rule of standing requires a personal interest in the outcome of the case, there are a number of exceptions which permit third parties to prosecute actions despite lacking such an interest. INDOT discusses three such exceptions in its petition to transfer, which we shall address in turn: public standing doctrine, associational standing doctrine, and parens patriae authority.
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In truth, it appears Union County has not asserted a standing argument at all, but rather has attempted to invoke parens patriae authority, which in Latin means “parent of his or her country,” and refers to “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens patriae, Black’s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed. 2014). But it has long been settled that “a state may act as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. However, a county has no sovereign powers and cannot act as parens patriae, asserting the claims of its residents.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Howard Cty. v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n, 263 Ind. 282, 295, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1975) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Shoemaker v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant Cty., 36 Ind. 175, 183–84 (1871) (holding that the county had no standing to sue the State to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens “unless the money belongs to the county.”). Union County is thus disqualified from claiming such authority in this case.
In sum, the trial court did not err in dismissing this action, as Union County has failed to plead any viable theory of standing to support its alleged cause of action.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Union County’s complaint for lack of standing.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur