Kirsch, J.
Jerry Wilson d/b/a Hoosier Pro Wrestling (“Wilson” or “HPW”) promoted and presented a wrestling event, which was held in a building at the Bartholomew County Fairgrounds. Crystal Jones (“Jones”) attended the wrestling event, and as she walked through the parking lot to her car at night, she was assaulted by an unknown assailant. Jones brought a negligence action against Wilson and Bartholomew County 4-H Fair, Inc., and, as is relevant here, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilson. [Footnote omitted.] Jones appeals, raising the following restated issue: whether the trial court properly determined that Wilson did not owe a duty to Jones to protect her from the criminal acts of a third person that occurred in the parking lot.
We affirm.
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In this case, the threshold inquiry is whether Wilson owed a duty to Jones, an invitee, to protect her from a criminal attack by an unknown assailant while she was in the parking lot around 11:00 p.m., having exited the building that Wilson had rented from the fairgrounds for the wrestling event. [Footnote omitted.] As a preliminary matter, we observe that the record before us indicates that Wilson rented the Family Arts building on the Bartholomew County Fairgrounds, but nothing establishes that any duty Wilson may have had to Jones that night extended beyond the Family Arts building and into the grassy area used for parking. … Assuming without deciding that any duty that Wilson owed to Jones would have extended to the parking lot, we turn to the issue of whether, based on existing caselaw concerning a landowner’s duty to protect invitees against attacks by third parties, Wilson had a duty in this case to protect Jones against the criminal attack.
Necessary to our decision today is consideration of, in particular, two 2016 Indiana Supreme Court cases, namely: Rogers v. Martin and Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. These cases “redrew the premises liability landscape[.]” Hoosier Mountain Bike Ass’n, 73 N.E.3d at 716 n.4. The Goodwin and Rogers cases reviewed the evolution of premises liability law in Indiana, initially observing the general duty a landowner owes to an invitee: a landowner must exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s protection while the invitee is on the premises. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 320. However, “although landlords owe invitees a well-established ‘duty to protect,’ courts must look at one critical element before extending that duty to cases where an invitee’s injury occurs not due to a dangerous condition of the land but due to some harmful activity on the premises. That element is foreseeability.” Id. at 324. That is, while landowners have a duty to take reasonable precaution to protect their invitees from criminal attacks by third parties, there is a foreseeability component in that analysis, requiring the trial court to decide, in the context of duty, whether the criminal act was foreseeable.
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Here, in support of his contention that the criminal assault on Jones was not foreseeable and that he did not owe a duty to Jones, Wilson submitted evidence showing that he rented the Family Arts building for one night from Bartholomew County 4-H Fair, Inc., as he had done on prior occasions, that the Agreement did not place obligations on Wilson to provide security for parking areas around the Family Arts building or take care of the lighting outside of the building, and that, Fisher, the Fair Board president, was not aware of any prior such criminal attacks in the twenty-plus years that he had been involved with the organization. Wilson argues that, applying the foreseeability test of Goodwin and Rogers, which requires an evaluation of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm, without consideration of the actual facts, he did not owe a duty to Jones. Specifically, Wilson argues, the broad type of plaintiff in this case was a paying spectator at a wrestling match and the broad type of harm was a random criminal attack, the type of which had not occurred in decades, occurring outside the building that Wilson had rented. Wilson argues that its designated evidence showed that any attack was not foreseeable, he did not owe a duty to Jones in that situation, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Wilson.
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In response, Wilson urges that the parking lot lights are not “a condition of the land,” pointing out that an assailant injured her, not the parking lot lights, and that she was not injured when she stepped in a hole or otherwise injured because of some condition of the land, and, therefore, this case is not a “condition of the land” case where duty has already been declared or articulated. We agree with Wilson in this regard. Jones’s injuries resulted from the conduct of a third person, and we find that the foreseeability test outlined in Goodwin and Rogers must be applied to see if a duty exists at all. Under that test – examining (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm, without consideration of the actual facts – we find that the harm inflicted on Jones was not normally to be expected, and thus not foreseeable, and Wilson did not owe a duty to Jones. See Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 393-94 (recognizing that, although bars “can often set the stage for rowdy behavior,” bar owners do not routinely contemplate that one patron might shoot another and shooting inside neighborhood bar was not foreseeable, such that bar owner did not owe duty to injured patron in that case); Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 326 (“Although house parties can often set the stage for raucous behavior, we do not believe that hosts of parties routinely physically fight guests whom they have invited. Ultimately, it is not reasonably foreseeable for a homeowner to expect this general harm to befall a house-party guest.”). Here, Jones has failed to carry her burden to show us that the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Wilson was improper.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.