Massa, J.
Bob Leonard was convicted of two counts of knowing murder, one count of conspiracy to commit arson, and dozens of counts of arson for his role in the 2012 Richmond Hill home explosion. The trial court sentenced him to Life Without Parole on each of the murder convictions, and consecutive terms of years for conspiracy and arson. In this direct appeal, Leonard raises several issues for our review, which we reorder and consolidate as follows: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the murder convictions; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support a statutory aggravator; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing Leonard’s lesser included jury instruction; and (4) whether Indiana’s LWOP sentencing statute is unconstitutional. We affirm, finding there was sufficient evidence for the murder convictions and statutory aggravator, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Leonard’s tendered instruction, and Indiana’s LWOP sentencing statute is not unconstitutional.
On November 10, 2012, at 11:08 p.m., the Marion County Sheriff’s Office received its first 911 call describing confusion, a huge bang, and homes shaking on Indianapolis’s southeast side. Over the following minutes and hours, 281 more 911 calls would be placed describing the impact from a home explosion in the Richmond Hill subdivision. Firefighters, located at a nearby station, were among those first to arrive. They observed at least one home “completely flattened” and many others with significant damage, substantial gas-fed fires, debris scattering the streets, and many residents wandering outside their homes, emotional and watching the chaos unfold around them. Investigators would later conclude that a natural gas explosion with the force of roughly three tons of TNT, originating from Monserrate Shirley’s home at 8349 Fieldfare Way, was to blame for the devastation and total destruction that occurred that night.
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Ultimately, the State of Indiana brought fifty felony charges against Leonard, including numerous counts of murder, arson, and conspiracy to commit arson. At trial, the State added two additional counts of knowing murder. On those murder charges, the State sought sentences of Life Without Parole, alleging three aggravating circumstances.
Extensive discovery and pre-trial proceedings ensued. After several delays, including a change of venue from Marion County, the guilt phase of Leonard’s jury trial began January 19, 2016 and concluded February 24, 2016, generating a twenty–volume transcript and over eighteen hundred exhibits. Following the guilt phase of trial, the jury found Leonard guilty as charged on all counts. That same day, Leonard waived his right to trial by jury for the penalty phase of the LWOP trial. Accordingly, the trial court conducted a hearing before the bench.
The trial court merged the felony murder and the knowing murder counts, and entered convictions on only the murder counts and most of the arson counts. Further, the trial court found “the three aggravating circumstances [had been] prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt” and that they “outweigh[ed] the absence of mitigating circumstances.” The trial court thus imposed consecutive Life Without Parole sentences for the two murder convictions, and further imposed 50 years for all of the arson counts, plus 20 years for conspiracy to be served consecutively to the LWOP sentences. …
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The evidence favorable to the judgment shows that Leonard planned to set a fire that would completely consume Shirley’s house with the intent to reap $300,000 in insurance money. … A jury could reasonably infer that Leonard’s intent to destroy everything in the home to get the full insurance payout contradicted other testimony regarding their plan to light a small fire.
… Investigators determined that the explosion was caused by intentionally removing the fireplace valve so that gas would leak into the house, and setting a timing device to trigger the fire. Moreover, Leonard and others had previously sealed the home so that gas could not escape, gasoline was poured on the floors, and the thermostat had been replaced. These efforts were done with the awareness that once a home is filled with gas, it will “pop or blow up.” …
… Thus, the jury could infer that Leonard’s actions were consistent with designing an explosion and fire that had a high probability of resulting in death.
In sum, we find the evidence is sufficient to sustain Leonard’s two knowing murder convictions.
The State sought LWOP based on three aggravating circumstances: (1) Leonard “committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an explosive with intent to injure a person or damage property,”; (2) Leonard “committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether [Leonard] has been convicted of that other murder,”; and (3) Leonard “burned [or] mutilated” John Longworth while he was alive, Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11). The trial court found the State proved each of the aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances.
On appeal, Leonard challenges only the subsection (b)(11) aggravator, arguing intentionality is required and the State offered insufficient evidence on that point. …
Leonard acknowledges that no cases have analyzed “burned” or “mutilated” in the context of subsection (b)(11); however, he cites to this Court’s opinion in Nicholson v. State, 768 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2002), which analyzed “torture,” also found in subsection (b)(11), in support of his argument that intentionality is required. This is the same argument raised by Mark Leonard in his direct appeal decided only months ago. See Mark Leonard, 73 N.E.3d at 163–65. We rejected that argument there, and for the same reasons we reject it here.
Toward the end of trial, Leonard submitted proposed final jury instructions, which included an instruction on reckless homicide. … The trial court agreed with the State, concluding that “[b]ased on the evidence that [it] heard and the arguments of counsel . . . [it would] decline to give a reckless homicide instruction as a lesser-included.”
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… While the evidence may not be “entirely free from doubt,” viewing it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, it is substantial enough to support the trial court’s conclusion that no serious evidentiary dispute existed. Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (Ind. 1996). Indeed, the trial court’s decision is given “considerable deference” because the court has the best view of the evidence, and here Leonard failed to develop enough specific evidence to indicate to the court that there was a serious dispute. Fish, 710 N.E.2d at 185. Thus, we affirm.
Leonard challenges Indiana’s Life Without Parole statutory sentencing scheme as unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). He argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not require a jury to find aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is identical to the one raised in Mark Leonard, 73 N.E.3d at 168–169, which we rejected. For the reasons set forth in that opinion, we likewise decline to find Indiana’s LWOP statutory scheme unconstitutional.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Leonard’s convictions and LWOP sentences.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.