Robb, J.
Following a bench trial, Allison Nickels was found guilty of domestic battery and interference with reporting of a crime. Nickels appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred by denying her an opportunity to present a closing argument.
…
After the parties rested their cases, the following occurred:
The Court: Okay. Argument?
[State]: Your Honor, I think there is plenty of . . .
The Court: You are right there is.
[State]: With regard to the battery taking place in front of the child.
The Court: Court finds for you, okay?
[State]: Thank you.
The Court: Do you have argument, [defense counsel]?
[Defense counsel]: Well, I don’t think that beyond a reasonable doubt that we have interference with reporting a crime but [Nickels] — to the extent that she can has been straightforward to some extent as far as what happened. That’s all I can tell you.
The Court: Okay. Recommendation counsel, [State]? First of all do you waive a PSI or do we need to have a PSI?
… The parties waived a pre-sentence investigation, made their recommendations as to sentencing, and the trial court found Nickels guilty as charged and sentenced her that same day to 558 days, which amounted to a time-served sentence. Nickels now appeals.
Nickels contends the trial court erred in denying her the right to make a closing argument and requests that her convictions be reversed due to the error.
The opportunity to make a closing argument is a basic element of the criminal process. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864-65 (1975) (holding that “the appellant, through counsel, had a right to be heard in summation” and to deny him the opportunity was to deny him the assistance of counsel and the right to present a defense). …
The State acknowledges the right to present a closing argument, but notes that “[a]lthough the trial court stated preliminarily that it was finding for the State, it invited Nickels’ trial counsel to give a closing argument.” Because Nickels did not object and in fact made a brief statement, the State contends Nickels has waived her claim that she was denied the opportunity to present a closing argument. … In this case, the trial court offered the State the opportunity to make an argument, interrupted the argument to announce it was finding for the State, and only asked for argument from Nickels after it had already announced its intention to find against her. …
… Under those circumstances, Nickels’ counsel did not have a clear opportunity to object to the trial court’s procedure as it appeared the trial court would be allowing closing arguments until it suddenly interrupted and, without allowing the defense to present a closing argument, announced its decision. …
Further, the fact that Nickels nonetheless made a brief argument does not cure the error. … Closing argument serves several purposes: it clarifies and sharpens the issues, gives the defense one last chance to persuade the trier of fact there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, and, in a bench trial, aids the judge’s decision-making by providing opposing viewpoints. See Herring, 422 U.S. at 862-64. …
Finally, the judgment here came down to a “duel of credibility”: the State presented evidence from Nickels’ ex-husband and Nickels testified on her own behalf as to the incident that occurred between the two of them. The credibility assessment was undeniably for the judge to make, but even though the trial was not complex or lengthy, Nickels still had a right to summarize the evidence from the point of view most favorable to her and to point out the weaknesses of the State’s position prior to the trial court making a decision.
Nickels had a right to present a closing argument without having to overcome the trial court’s pre-judgment. Because she was not afforded that right, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.