Bailey, J.
Case Summary
J.B. (“Father”) and S.W. (“Mother”) are the parents of one daughter, G.G.B.W. (“Child”). In 2015, Father petitioned to modify legal custody of Child, and subsequently filed a contempt petition and motion for rule to show cause in which Father alleged that Mother was in violation of a paternity decree. The trial court denied Father’s petitions and motion, and ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney fees. Father now appeals.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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Contempt
Father challenges the trial court’s contempt determination, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the Decree when it failed to hold Mother in contempt…
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One of Father’s arguments is that the plain language of the Decree “calls for vaccinations based on the school’s requirements.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Father directs us to the vaccination provision in the Decree, which reads: “If the child attends a school that requires vaccinations for enrollment, and the child will be denied enrollment unless she receives the vaccinations, then the child will be given the required vaccinations for enrollment.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 51. Father contends that this provision provides no exception. Mother responsively argues that Child was not denied enrollment because Mother submitted the religious objection form, and so because Child was not denied enrollment, the vaccination provision does not require Child’s vaccination.
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Here, the Decree gives Mother latitude to make a range of decisions without input—and to make major medical, religious, and educational decisions after consulting Father. The vaccination provision, however, is a specific exception to this general rule. “It is well settled that when interpreting a contract, specific terms control over general terms.” GPI at Danville Crossing, L.P. v. W. Cent. Conservancy Dist., 867 N.E.2d 645, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Thus, where the vaccination provision applies, the vaccination provision controls— without reference to the general legal-custody provision. See id.
The vaccination provision became applicable when Child reached school age, and it links the vaccination requirement to that of the school. Under the provision, Child could attend the Montessori school unvaccinated because vaccination was not a condition of enrollment. The public school, however, required vaccination, and the only reason Child could attend was because Mother claimed a religious objection to vaccination. “[U]nless the contract provides otherwise, all applicable law in force at the time the agreement is made impliedly forms a part of the agreement, because the parties are presumed to have had the law in mind.” Schwartz v. Heeter, 994 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Ind. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The religious objection exemption to the vaccination requirement has been in effect since 2005. Therefore, the parties are presumed to have been aware of it when they entered into their agreement in 2011. If the parties intended the religious objection exemption to apply, they most likely would not have included the vaccination provision in the agreement at all, because a religious objection would always trump a school’s vaccination requirement and the provision would be meaningless. At the very least, the parties could have provided for this exemption to the vaccination requirement in their agreement. Yet, the vaccination provision of the Decree is silent as to the religious objection exemption. Because there is no such exception in the language of the agreement and reading one in would void the provision, and because Mother’s wide latitude for decision-making is limited in this instance by the specific vaccination provision, the Decree accordingly requires that Child be vaccinated based on her school’s requirements.
The vaccination provision is clear that Child must be vaccinated if her school requires it regardless of the existence of the statutory exemption. We acknowledge, as the trial court did, that the religious objection statute does not impose a good faith requirement in order to invoke the exemption. We further acknowledge the trial court found “Mother’s testimony regarding her personal religious beliefs and how those affect her opinion on vaccinations to be sincere and valid to her.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 40. Although Mother’s “religious objection” to vaccinations seems dubious given evidence that the religion she professes to practice does not in fact have a tenet objecting to administering vaccinations, the proper use and application of the religious exemption here is not at issue. Whether or not Mother would otherwise be entitled to invoke a religious objection to vaccinations, she is not entitled to do so here where she is subject to a court order approving an agreement she willingly entered into that requires vaccinations under these circumstances. Based on our interpretation of the contract between the parties, we conclude the trial court’s failure to find Mother in contempt for submitting the religious objection form to circumvent the agreement is contrary to law.
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Custody Modification
Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition to modify legal custody of Child based on Child not receiving any vaccinations since birth….
With respect to modification of legal custody, a trial court should specifically consider whether there has also been a change in one of the statutory factors governing awards of joint legal custody. Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1259-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)….
Here, Mother and Father shared joint legal custody of Child, which was defined as requiring Mother to seek Father’s input before making any major medical, religious, or educational decisions for Child. We concluded above that the Decree requires that Child be vaccinated based on her school’s requirements and that Mother is in contempt for submitting the religious objection form in order to circumvent the parties’ agreement. Based on Mother’s actions, there is a substantial change in Mother’s ability to communicate and cooperate with Father in advancing Child’s welfare. For the same reasons, modification of legal custody is in Child’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father’s petition to modify legal custody of Child for the limited purpose of making medical decisions concerning vaccinations.
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Conclusion
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father’s contempt petition and related motion for rule to show cause, based on its misinterpretation of the Decree when analyzing the issues of this case. The trial court also abused its discretion in denying Father’s petition to modify legal custody of Child for the limited purpose of making medical vaccination decisions. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Father to contribute toward Mother’s attorney fees. Neither party challenges the denial of Father’s request for an order of estoppel, and we accordingly leave that portion of the trial court’s order undisturbed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.