May, J.
P.S. appeals the trial court’s decision to place him on GPS monitoring following his violation of the protective order (“PO”) in place to protect T.W. from P.S. P.S. argues GPS monitoring is inappropriate for two reasons: (1) he was not on notice that GPS monitoring was a possible consequence of violating the PO; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove he violated the PO. We affirm.
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P.S. cites no case law to support his argument the trial court was required to apprise him of all possible penalties for violating the PO. Further, it is well-established “[a]ll persons are charged with the knowledge of the rights and remedies prescribed by statute.” Middleton Motors, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Gross Income Tax Div., 380 N.E.2d 79, 81, 269 Ind. 282, 285 (1978). As P.S., like every person in Indiana, is charged with knowing the law of the state, we cannot say he lacked notice of the possibility he could be subject to GPS monitoring if he violated the PO. See, e.g., Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1263 (Ind. 2015) (person of ordinary intelligence charged with knowing list of prohibited synthetic drugs as prescribed by Pharmacy Board Emergency Rules referenced in the relevant criminal statute); see also Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 317, 15 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1938) (“all have an equal opportunity to know the law, and are presumed to know it”).
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Conclusion
P.S. had notice he could be placed on GPS monitoring if he violated the PO and T.W. presented sufficient evidence he violated the PO. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding P.S. violated the PO and it did not err when it ordered him to submit to GPS monitoring as a penalty for that violation. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.