Pyle, J.
Statement of the Case
J.J. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order adjudicating her son, K.S. (“K.S.”), to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother argues that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that K.S.’s physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of Mother’s inability, refusal, or neglect to supply K.S. with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision. Finding that DCS failed to present evidence, let alone sufficient evidence, that K.S.’s physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered and that Mother was unable to supply K.S. with necessary shelter, we reverse the CHINS adjudication. [Footnote omitted.]
We reverse.
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Here, Mother specifically contends that DCS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that K.S.’s physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of Mother’s inability, refusal, or neglect to supply K.S. with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision. We agree.
As set forth in the relevant CHINS statute, it is DCS’s burden to prove that a parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered her child and that the child’s specific needs have not been met. The trial court adjudicated K.S. to be a CHINS after concluding that Mother used marijuana and did not have stable housing. As to the first finding, Mother admitted that she had used marijuana two months before K.S.’s birth to increase her appetite during pregnancy. However, there is no evidence showing how, specifically, Mother’s use of marijuana two months prior to giving birth seriously impaired or seriously endangered K.S. DCS presented no evidence that he tested positive for marijuana, or, even if he did, how a positive marijuana test would have or did endanger him. See In the Matter of S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that there was no evidence presented that infant H.G. was endangered when he was born with marijuana-positive meconium). In fact, testimony at the hearing revealed that during his first days of life, K.S. was “feeding well” and that there was nothing other to note. (Tr. 25). During supervised visits with K.S. shortly after his birth, Mother was engaged and loving and “did everything you expected a mother to do.” (Tr. 53). At the time of the fact-finding hearing, K.S.’s foster mother testified that he was developing well and meeting his milestones.
As to the second finding, DCS presented absolutely no evidence that Mother did not have stable housing. Rather, our review of the evidence reveals that within twenty-four hours of K.S.’s birth, Mother told FCM Johnson that she and her son planned to live with her cousin when they were discharged from the hospital. Mother’s testimony at the fact-finding hearing confirmed that Mother had moved in with her cousin and had lived there for several months. Mother’s statement to Case Manager Simpson that she felt that she “wasn’t really wanted” at her cousin’s house does not support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother did not have stable housing. (Tr. 48). Although the trial court may have been concerned that at some point, Mother and K.S. would be asked to move out of Mother’s cousin’s house, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, this had not happened. See S.M. (explaining that future concerns rather than present facts are not enough to support a CHINS adjudication). Based upon the totality of this evidence, there is insufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication.
Reversed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.